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1 INTRODUCTION
Cities and towns are centres of population concentration, production and consumption.
Urban space is used as the location of human activity, the source of raw materials and the site
for the disposal of waste products from human activities (Merrett, 1995:7). This use makes
urban centres critical in the promotion of human welfare, the growth and diversification of
economies and the preservation of natural resources (Tietenberg, 1984:17; Woodhouse
1992:103) not only locally but at the national level as well. The nature of urbanisation and
urban areas presents challenges and opportunities for immediate production and consumption
(cf. Kamete et al., 2001). Furthermore, there is the additional and perhaps more formidable
challenge of ensuring that the basis of this production and consumption benefits all sectors of
society now and is maintained well into the future. Therein comes the issue of sustainability.
For this reason, urban local authorities find themselves in a situation where they have to look
after and satisfy the (not always compatible) needs of society, economy and nature. This is
not any easy task. It involves a complex balancing game. How well this game is played
depends in part on the system of urban governance. In the search for sustainable urban
development the way rulers deal with the ruled is as important as the relationship between
nature, society and the economy. It can be argued that urban governance ultimately
determines the outcome of this mostly antagonistic interface between the three dimensions.
This paper explores the hunt for sustainable urban development in the face of particular
systems of urban governance. It is an attempt to assess how one urban local authority has
attempted to integrate poverty and the environment in the search for the sustainable city. The
next section discusses sustainability and sustainable urban development. This is followed by
an overview of urban governance, urban poverty and the urban environment. Thereafter the
discussion focuses on the experiences of Harare, Zimbabwe’s capital.
2 SUSTAINABILITY AND SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT: AN
OVERVIEW
The overused concept of sustainability is critical to any discussion of sustainable urban
development. Unfortunately, “there is much confusion on the meaning of the concept”
(Atkinson, 1994:97). Some commentators distinguish between social, economic and
ecological sustainability (see Hardoy et al., 1992). Despite some definitional confusion and
disagreements, it can be argued that the basics of sustainability revolve around the issue of
maintenance or improvement of ‘wellbeing’ in any one of the three dimensions. For this
wellbeing to be sustainable it needs to satisfy some basic conditions (cf. Blowers, 1992: 27;
Brugmann, 1994:129–30; White, 1994), namely,
1. The benefits can be passed on to future generations (intergenerational equity)
2. The benefits are shared across all sectors of society (intragenerational equity)
3. Improvements in one dimension do not retrogressively affect the wellbeing of the other
two dimensions.
Perhaps the most succinct conceptualisation of sustainability is that by Castells (2000:118)
who argues that for sustainability to be possible it is necessary that “the conditions of
production do not destroy over time the conditions of…reproduction.” This statement
captures the essence of the three conditions above. The conditions of reproduction are among
others human, economic and environmental. This agrees with the UNDP (1997: 2), which
adopts the characteristic pronouncements on sustainability in the presentation of its “five
2aspects to sustainable human development”. The agency cautions that the pursuit of the
present generation’s needs must not cripple “the right of future generations to be free of
poverty and deprivation and to exercise their basic capabilities” (UNDP, 1997: 2). The
sentiment is shared by a commentary that brings out the multifaceted and dynamic nature of
sustainability by stressing the need for long-term focus on “human capacity building, social,
economic...and…ecological functions of the natural surroundings and the resources they
generate” (RSAS, 1995: 5).
Thus in the search for sustainable urban development it is necessary to concentrate on the
natural environment; but the human and economic dimensions are equally significant. In one
of the most explicit articulations of the need for balance Habitat stresses “balanced social,
economic and environmental priorities” as one of the objectives of sustainability (UNCHS,
2000:16). The agency labels this condition “sustainability in all dimensions of urban
development” and stresses that sustainability affects the needs of both present and future
generations as (UNCHS, 2000: 12; cf. Boxes 1 and 2).
BOX 1: URBAN SUSTAINABILITY: A FULLER CONCEPTUALISATION?
Drakakis-Smith (1997) draws up a list of requirements that must be satisfied
for “developing sustainability in an urban context”. The list includes:
¨ Equity, social justice and human rights
¨ Basic human rights
¨ Social and ethnic self determination
¨ Environmental awareness and integrity
¨ Awareness of inter-linkages across both space and time
Be that as it may, some commentators maintain that while the economic and environmental
aspects have received widespread attention, the social dimension has at best only received
"passing comments" (Yiftachel and Hedgcock, 1993: 139). This virtual neglect of society can
be taken as a symptom of that interpretation of sustainability which has been described as
“…a narrow concept preoccupied with the sustained use or utilisation of the resource base”
(Pierce, 1992: 310–12). Obviously this perception is not an improvement on earlier
development policies whose sole concern was the national economy.1
In contrast, sustainable urban development should not display evidence of this imbalance in
emphasis where any one of the three sectors thrives at the expense of the other two. Evidence
from development policy reveals that unbalanced development cannot be sustained over time.
Economically biased policies that focus on growth and stability have not been benefiting, and
are sometimes even harming, the social and environmental fabric. Wisner (1988: 4) points out
that these "development-as-growth" strategies failed to benefit the poorest 60 percent of the
population in the developing world. Not surprisingly, therefore, in as much as there is a
relationship between poverty and environmental degradation, there is a relationship between
prosperity and environmental damage (Priemus, 1999: 218).
At the other extreme, policies aimed exclusively at promoting social wellbeing such as those
aimed at redistribution or enhancing access to basic needs and service, have sometimes
                                                  
1 In this case economic development was perceived as “…a material and organisational process measurable in
some monetary unit in which the natural assets of a region or country are transformed to produce an improvement
in the general welfare of its population” (Pierce, 1992: 307). The adverse ecological and social impacts of
policies based on this conceptualisation of development are well-documented (see below).
3resulted in economic stagnation or decline, with corresponding negative impacts on the
natural environment. The economic and ecological mess in some former Marxist economies
such as those of Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Ethiopia is partly a result of elevating society
above nature and economy (Zimbabwe, 1981, 1986, 1991; Kamete, 1998). This indicates that
social prosperity that is not supported by a healthy environment and stable economy is at best
temporary and therefore unsustainable.
On the basis of these observations it can be argued that policies that are preoccupied with
environmental protection regardless of the impact on society and the economy can only
achieve their goals at the expense of these two. Similarly economically biased policies will
inevitably inflict some damage on society and nature, while policies that are obsessed with
social wellbeing to the exclusion of nature and economy will yield unsavoury economic and
environmental side-effects (Bartelmus 1980:2; Conyers and Hills, 1984; Wisner, 1988;
WCED, 1987; Kamete, 1992; Drakakis-Smith, 1995; UNDP, 1997). Development policy
should therefore transcend “mere environmental friendliness”, economic prosperity or social
wellbeing, but should aim at “…the establishment of a good symbiosis” between ecological,
social and economic components” (Priemus, 1999: 263).
BOX 2: SUSTAINABLE CITIES & LOCAL GOVERNANCE
A Sustainable City...
is a city where achievements in social, economic, and physical
development are made to last. A Sustainable City has a lasting supply of
the natural resources on which its development depends (using them only
at a level of sustainable yield). A Sustainable City maintains a lasting
security from environmental hazards which may threaten development
achievements (allowing only for acceptable risk).
Source: UNCHS 2000
In view of the above the introduction of the concept of sustainability to the urban context in
the 1990s is a welcome development. This is especially so because in urban areas the link
between environmental, social and economic aspects seems to be underplayed. Sustainable
urban development seems to answer a pertinent question raised by one commentator
concerning "…the form and content of a development model that is economically equitable,
socially ennobling, and environmentally balanced…" (Riddel, 1980: x). Some analysts and
practitioners have answered this challenge by combining the conventional economic and
social dimensions with the quality of the natural environment to come up with indicators of
sustainability (Domanski, 2000:1205; cf. Miller and De Roo, 1999). This wider perception
prefers integrated urban development that embraces both socio-economic and ecological
aspects.
3 SOME DETERMINANTS OF SUSTAINABLE URBAN DEVELOPMENT
This section attempts to examine the forces at work in the search for sustainable urban
development in Zimbabwe. These are urban governance, urban poverty and the urban
environment. The aim is to chart out the relationships between these forces so as to draw out
the implications for urban sustainability. It should be pointed out that urban governance and
poverty are by no means the only determinants of urban sustainability. There are a host of
other forces that are equally significant. Among them are institutional, cultural, socio-political
and legislative dimensions that are too complicated to be covered under governance and
4poverty (see UNDP, 1997; UNCHS/UNEP, 2000; Griffin, 2001). The precise relationships and
interaction of the determinants featured in this paper are laid out in Figure 1.
5FIGURE 1: THE INTERACTION OF THE FOUR DETERMINANTS OF URBAN SUSTAINABILITY
The following section will put these relationships into context by examining individual
concepts and the state of knowledge, consensus and controversy surrounding each of them. It
is interesting to note here that a recent commentary on urban management points out that for
cities to be sustainable they should be “first and foremost livable (sic), competitive, well
managed and well governed” (Griffin, 2001: 63). Liveability implies that society and the
environment are conducive to life and life sustaining processes and make the urban area
worth living in. This rules out poverty and a degraded natural environment. Competitiveness
and management, which are easily reflected in society and nature, are themselves products of
urban governance.
3.1 Urban governance
Sustainable urban development in Zimbabwe hinges on urban governance. Governance in this
case is more than the "act of ruling" (see Onibokuni, 1995: 3). It is a perspective that focuses
on the relationship between ‘the governors’ (the rulers) and ‘the governed’ (the ruled) (Olowu
and Akinola, 1995), and thus revolves around the whole spectrum of civil and political
institutions, relationships and processes. Like sustainability, the concept of governance is
neither simple nor free of controversy (UNCHS, 2000: 1). The definition of governance by the
UNDP (1997: 2–3) is one of the most comprehensive attempts so far. The agency defines
governance as:
The exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the
management of a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms,
processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their
interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their
differences.
In a commentary on this definition another UN agency (UNCHS, 2000: 8) emphasises the
distinction between governance and government and points out that in the concept of
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6governance power is viewed as existing within government as well as outside it. Besides
government other institutions that are seen to have power include civil society and the private
sector. Informal institutions are also factored into the decision-making and power brokering
formulae. The argument is that relationships and processes between the stakeholders are (or
should be) the basis of decision-making. In the light of this, one source maintains that
governance “… is about roles, rules and relationships…” (GDRC, 2000).
Like sustainability governance has been appropriated into the urban arena where it is regarded
as reflecting “…the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private
plan and manage the common affairs of the city” (UNCHS, 2000: 9). Involved as it is with
diversity, urban governance inevitably includes the resolution of conflicts and
accommodation of diverse interests in order to promote “co-operative action.” The mediation
of differences is increasingly becoming a common trait in the discussions of urban
governance. It is as important as the articulation of interests and the exercise of legal rights
and obligations (GDRC, 2000).
BOX 3: HABITAT’S “GLOBAL NORMS FOR GOOD URBAN
GOVERNANCE”
¨ Legitimacy and accountability of government
¨ Freedom of association and participation
¨ Empowering women as a key poverty eradication strategy
¨ Fair and legal frameworks for a predictable and secure living
environment for citizens
¨ Availability and validity of information
¨ Efficient public sector management
¨ Enabling the participation of children in decision-making processes
“For this reason, the campaign proposes that good urban governance is
characterized by sustainability, subsidiarity, equity, efficiency,
transparency and accountability, civic engagement and citizenship,
and security, and that these norms are interdependent and mutually
reinforcing.”
Source: UNCHS, 2000:11 (Emphasis in original)
The debate on urban governance has assumed normative overtones through the search for
‘good’ urban governance. Among the numerous prescriptions for good urban governance are
attributes like transparency, popular accountability, efficiency, participation, trust, reciprocity,
legitimacy and representativeness in the conduct of public affairs, as well as respect for
human rights and rule of law (Olowu and Akinola, 1995: 20; Harpham and Boateng, 1997;
Wekwete, 1997; GDRC, 2000). The UNCHS has gone beyond this to search for what it
considers to be norms of good urban governance (Box 3, cf. Box 4).
Diversity in urban areas necessitates the incorporation of the mediation, management and
resolution of conflict as an integral component of urban governance. It also makes it
imperative that all different groups, interests and viewpoints are taken on board in the
planning and management of the common affairs of the city. It is not surprising therefore that
the Global Campaign for Good Urban Governance amplifies the concept of the “Inclusive
City” and “inclusive decision making” to deal with the “…messy reality of competing
interests and priorities” in order to “…balance, reconcile and trade off the competing
interests” (UNCHS, 2000: 9). The Sustainable Cities Programme (SCP) describes the outcome
of this strategy as “broad-based local governance” (UNCHS/UNEP, 2000: 2).
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This is an important recognition that brings to the fore the immensity of the potential and
problems in urban governance. Urban areas are not like isolated villages that are mostly
homogeneous and share common perspectives in important matters. Urban areas are
cosmopolitan. They have a multiplicity of social, economic, political, religious compositions,
orientations and persuasions. Even within one category, say race, there will be several
subcategories in terms of economic standing, age, gender and political persuasion. The
management of diversity is thus complex. Indeed, as noted by Habitat, it is a “messy reality”.
3.2 Urban poverty
Urban poverty, like sustainable urban development and urban governance, borrows heavily
from its wider global parent concept, which in this case is poverty. Discussions on what
poverty is, how it is measured, who can be considered to be poor and how it can be addressed
are among the richest and most enduring (see World Bank, 2000, 2001; Kamete et al., 2001
for a fuller discussion).2 However poverty is defined, diagnosed or measured there is one
common thread, namely that it is something undesirable and those affected by it or being
threatened by it are in a bad situation. Whether poverty is about incomes that are below the
minimum required for basic survival, lack of access to basic services, a lack of power,
exclusion from basic socio-political and economic processes, vulnerability or insecurity (cf.
Chambers, 1995: 175) what is being implied is that something is wrong and it should not be
so. If development is taken as “good change” (Chambers, 1995: 174) then surely any change
in the direction of poverty is ‘bad change.’ By extension poverty is not conducive to
‘development’ including sustainable urban development.
The Recife Declaration (IFUP, 1996: 3) summarises what many commentators have realised
for a long time. The landmark declaration observes:
                                                  
2 This section will not reproduce the debates but will instead capture the basic essentials in these debates and
trends.
8The poor experience not only a lack of income or access to basic assets and
basic services, but also a devalued social status, marginalisation in urban
space and a degraded living environment, limited access to justice,
information, education, decision-making power, and citizenship; and
vulnerability to violence and loss of security.
The summary reflects the increasing complexity of urban poverty. However, it does appear
that the diagnosis and monitoring of urban poverty, particularly in terms of measurement, is
still dominated by monetary aspects typical of the popular – and convenient – poverty lines.
Income continues to exert an irresistible attraction among both academics and practitioners
(Wratten, 1995: 12–13; Box 5). The perennial linkage between poverty and ‘low-income
groups’ is a testimony to this. This in part explains why strategies to address poverty almost
always have dominant income components (Box 5; see Mitlin, 1997; cf. Hanna and Oh,
2000).
BOX 5: ASSESSING URBAN POVERTY: THE POWER OF INCOME
Income (or consumption) is the most frequently used proxy for poverty.
Money-based poverty definitions and assessments provide a standard
scale so those different population groups can be compared. For
comparisons across very different types of settlements (such as between
rural and urban areas), it is important that quantitative measures take
adequate account of major differences in the minimum essential
“consumption basket” and the differential prices faced for goods and
services Social indicators, such as life expectancy and infant mortality
are also important. Definitions and benchmarks should allow the living
conditions of different population groups to be compared with others.
Source: World Bank, 2001: 8
According to Moser et al. (1996) urban poverty is linked to three features of urban life, viz.,
commoditisation, environmental hazard and social fragmentation. Commoditisation signifies
reliance on the cash economy, environmental hazard stems from high densities, “hazardous
location of settlements and exposure to multiple pollutants” and social fragmentation
primarily means a “lack of community and inter-household mechanisms for social security,
relative to those in rural areas” (World Bank, 2001: 3). Some analysts strongly argue that there
are some policies and management practices that cause or exacerbate urban poverty. Among
these are corruption, mismanagement and bad governance (see Olowu and Akinola, 1995;
World Bank, 2001).
The impacts of urban poverty are all too obvious. They are as undesirable as the phenomenon
of poverty itself. But they are not simple and straightforward. Because poverty is
“…characterised by cumulative deprivations” (Baharoglu, and Kessides, 2001: 6), poverty
‘types’ can generate or worsen other manifestations of poverty. Figure 2 illustrates the
cumulative impacts of urban poverty as conceptualised by Baharoglu and Kessides.
9FIGURE 2: CUMULATIVE IMPACTS OF URBAN POVERTY
Source: Baharoglu and Kessides, 2001: 6
The diagram suggests that the complexities in the identification of poverty can easily spill over
into the diagnosis of its impacts. Some impacts of poverty directly produce their own
distinctive impacts. An example in Figure 2 is the lack of employment, which directly results
in unemployed persons not having access to credit. In addition, these simple direct impacts
create their own impact while at the same time contributing to the aggravation of the impacts
of other processes and events in urban development. For example, the inability to access
credit, which as noted above is a result of unemployment, results in those affected not being
able to afford decent accommodation, which itself results in unhygienic living conditions.
This further heightens the sense of insecurity and disempowerment.
3.3 The urban natural environment
This section looks at the natural environment in urban centres. It is not a detailed ecological
description but rather a highlight of the important position the environment occupies and how
it feeds into the wider concept of urban sustainability. Urbanisation in part involves a change
in economic activities. It is a change that is clearly manifested in the structure of the economy
which becomes less agrarian as urbanisation boosts industrialisation (cf. World Bank, 2000;
Kamete et al., 2001). Obviously this signals a change in the use to which the environment is
put as well as the intensity of that use.
The establishment and growth of urban centres result in a concentration of people in limited
spaces (Kamete et al., 2001.). These are people who are in no way self-sufficient and have to
be served by a variety of urban functions and services and networks in order to be able to
exist and indeed function in urban space. Urbanisation thus introduces ‘novel’ land use
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patterns that rely more on secondary activities – like processing, manufacturing – and tertiary
activities –like finance and other specialised services – than on primary extractive activities.
In such ‘modernised’ urban economies the natural environment finds itself being used in
three principal activities, namely source, site and sink (Merrett, 1995: 7). Of critical importance
in determining the fate of the environment in the face of such usage are indicators like
population size, production per capita, consumption per capita, production structure and
efficiency (Stolwijk et al., 1998 in Priemus, 1999: 218). As Priemus (1999: 218) notes, some
factors like increased population, production and consumption “show a positive correlation
with environmental damage” while others among them input-output efficiency and changes in
production structure “cast a different light on the issue”.
FIGURE 3: USING THE URBAN NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
Figure 3 shows the multiplicity of purposes to which urban residents and institutions put the
environment. The arrows indicate that the principal human activities of extraction, production
and reproduction churn out waste products that are sunk back into the environment. There are
two points that should be noted here.
First the environment can and often does become overstretched and overloaded. This is borne
out by the abundance of studies on such aspects as carrying capacity, bubble concept and the
ecological footprint whose object is to measure and communicate pressure on the
environment (Priemus, 1999: 216; Rees, 1999; Price, 1999; Costanza et al., 2000; Witten,
2001; Jenkins and Bond, 2001;). These studies are meant to sound out whether environmental
damage is running out of control as shown by negative effects on environmental quality,
biodiversity, health and wellbeing (van der Waals, 1997 in Priemus, 1999: 217). What makes
these measurement concepts important is the fact that “both the human population and the
average consumption are increasing while the total area of productive land and stocks of
natural capital are fixed or in decline” (Rees, 1996: 195). Nowhere is this more evident than in
urban areas.
Second, the environment can and does become the victim of misuse and abuse (Hoffman,
2001). While some of this is motivated by greed and some by need the common denominator
Extraction
Source of
raw
materials
Production
Site for
productive
activities
Disposal
Sink for waste
products
Reproduction
Site for sustenance,
growth,
socialisation, etc
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is that the environment is being used improperly. Cases of industrialists dumping toxic waste
and effluent into water sources are common in Zimbabwe (see below). The industrialists in
question would rather pay a paltry fine (if they are caught) than invest large amounts of
money in proper waste disposal facilities. The same has been observed in the management of
hazardous waste (Mubvami, 1997). Again urban areas are home to most of these misdeeds.
These two points explain the abundance of prescriptive and protective instruments in the form
of carefully crafted and often complex legal, policy and institutional frameworks (see
Mubvami, 1997; Kamete, 2001). Consequently for some time now there have been lively
debates on environmental preservation and human livelihood (Merrett, 1995; Kamete, 1998;).
In these debates “the preservation of the ecosystem by a careful use of natural resources”
(Bolay and Du, 1999: 66) is juxtaposed with – or even pitted against – such welfare indicators
as employment, public health, basic services, poverty, sanitation and general wellbeing. Even
though there is general agreement that it is impossible to preserve or improve the environment
without attending to living conditions and vice versa, the debates still rage on.
BOX 6: SUSTAINABILITY: PRESERVATION OR CONSERVATION?
Pearce et al. (1990: 20) present an interesting definition of sustainable
development (cf. WCED, 1987: 43). They conceptualise development as a
value word that implies desirable change. It thus becomes a vector of
desirable social objectives, representing "...a list of the attributes which
society wishes to achieve or maximise" (page 20). The list might include
access to resources, a fairer distribution of income, and increases in real
income per capita. Representing all these attributes by a single proxy
indicator will define sustainable development as "... a situation in which the
development vector D does not decrease over time" (page 3). This gives
rise to two variants of the concept, namely strong sustainability and weak
sustainability.
1. ‘Strong sustainability’ requires that the change of D with respect to
time must be positive each and every period. Incorporated into cost-
benefit analysis (CBA), this means that netted across a set of projects
the sum of individual damages should be zero or negative at all times.
2. In ‘weak sustainability’ emphasis is placed on the present value of
development benefits, which ultimately should be positive. This allows
for periodic negative values of D with respect to time (cf. Bojo et al.,
1990: 13).
Merrett (1995: 11) provides useful enlightenment on this debate. In an insightful article rarely
quoted he picks out two strands of environmentalism, namely, preservation and conservation
(cf. Kamete, 1998). Preservation is more aggressive. It seeks to protect nature against
humankind. Conservation is more conciliatory. Its goal is to protect the environment “for the
benefit of man (sic)” (Merrett, 1995: 11). These two strands can be fitted into what Pearce et
al., 1990) refer to as “strong sustainability” and “weak sustainability” (Box 5). This
groundbreaking redefinition of urban environmentalism has major repercussions on urban
sustainability. There is a possibility that one dimension (nature) is shoved into battle against
others (society and the economy). How this tension is resolved and the outcomes therefrom
depend largely on the system of urban governance.
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4 THE URBAN GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
Urban governance has a lot to do with sustainable urban development. This becomes clear
when urban governance is conceptualised as a system with identifiable inputs, processes and
outputs. As will be argued later in this discussion, if the inputs into the system of governance
consist of wrongly defined concepts of sustainability and governance, it is these concepts that
will be processed; and the outputs will by no means usher in an era of sustainability.
The preceding and following discussions hinge on three key issues. Firstly, urban
sustainability should never be perceived or operationalised in terms of a single dimension.
This approach can lead to negative repercussions on the other dimensions. Secondly, the
realisation and achievement of sustainable urban development depends very much on urban
governance. It is the type of urban governance that is in a way entrusted with achieving urban
sustainability. By virtue of this stewardship the system of urban governance is in a position to
‘make or break’ urban sustainability. The third issue relates to the argument that the
destruction, degradation and deterioration of the urban natural environment including the
biosphere can in part be explained in terms of the survival strategies of the poor.
This part of the paper reviews aspects of urban governance that have implications for urban
sustainability. The urban ‘governors’ (elected policy makers and professional policy
executors) feature prominently in this discussion by virtue of the crucial role they play in
terms of the institutions they create and/or operate in and the operational procedures they
adopt. They are the ‘drivers’ of the governance system. It is them who decide whether civil
society, the private sector, households and individuals are invited and/or ‘admitted’ into the
system. The discussion will tackle the governance system in terms of inputs, processes and
outputs.
4.1 Some inputs into the system of urban governance
The inputs into the urban governance system are manifold. They come from a variety of
sources. For the sake of convenience the paper will limit itself to those that are of direct
relevance to sustainable urban development. Table 1 summarises some of the major inputs in
terms of source, instrument and effect. The inputs are viewed in the context of local
governance at the urban level. From Table 1 three principal sources can be identified, namely
the governors (central and local government) the governed (civil society, private sector,
households and individuals) and observers (international organisations).
An examination of the system over the years leads to the conclusion that urban local
authorities in Zimbabwe are very receptive to input emanating from the first two sources, that
is, central and local government. Those from central government are obligatory and the urban
governors have no choice but to conform. Those generated from within are binding. It is the
last two sets of inputs that present an interesting area of analysis.3 In their dealings with civil
society, the private sector and international agencies, urban governors have a choice as to
what to accept or reject. As noted in the table their exact responses to the stimuli from civil
society, the private sector, households and individuals are shaped by the internal
characteristics of the issue being addressed and the system of governance itself. Among the
                                                  
3It should be noted that these last two also feed into central government. But for the sake of simplicity they will
not be dealt with at length.
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important “issue characteristics” are the issue’s sensitivity, particularity, fashionability,
repercussions and emotive aspects (see Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).
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Table 1: Inputs into the system of urban governance in Zimbabwean
Source Instrument Effects on local authority
Central Government Statutes, policies, circulars,
regulations, directives
¨ Compulsory
¨ (Should be) wholly and actively
implemented
¨ Cannot be amended at local
level
Local Government By-laws, plans, policies,
aspirations, resolutions
¨ Binding
¨ ( Normally)wholly and actively
enforced
¨ Can be suspended, reversed, or
amended internally
¨ Civil society,
¨ The private sector
¨ Households
¨ Individual residents
Petitions, suggestions, protests,
threats
Depends on the sensitivity of the
governance system and the
particularity or fashionableness of
the issue, as well as the perceived
gains
The international arena Concepts recommendations,
conditionalities
¨ Potentially influential;
¨ Most accepted and acted on
4.2 Processes
How the inputs are processed will determine the outcome of any activity the governance
system is involved in. The same applies to urban sustainability. Zimbabwean urban centres
have a complex array of politicians and professionals whose processing of the received inputs
has shaped the governance system over the years. Figure 4 captures the processing of various
stimuli by the governance system. As indicated in the diagram the processes comprise
variants of two major activities, namely, analysis and synthesis. The former consists of the
identification, examination and sometimes dissembling of the stimuli into its constituent
components in order to understand it better. It is this process that results in particular
interpretations and understandings.
FIGURE 4: THE PROCESSING OF INPUTS BY THE URBAN GOVERNANCE SYSTEM.
Synthesis is basically the composition or combination of separate or diverse elements of
stimuli into a whole. It is by synthesis that the basic building blocks for policies, strategies and
other instruments are put together. Analysis and synthesis are by no means clean-cut
processes. Some critical background processes, among them communication, negotiation,
Stimulus Reception Accepted
Synthesis
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Outputs
Rejected
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Negotiation
Threats
Manipulation
Bargaining
Pressure,
Persuasion,
Bargaining
Refined,
redefined
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threats, manipulation, placation and bargaining to a large extent influence the processing of
the inputs from the various sources (Figure 4). Whether and how analysis and synthesis take
place, where, when, with and by whom these processes are done are issues that are critical in
moulding the outcome of the processes. It is the opinions and groups that are heard and/or
represented and/or consulted whose understanding and interpretation of the situation will
determine the output. As will be seen later the structure of the system and its modus operandi
can and does result in exclusion, which is an indicator of bad urban governance (UNCHS,
2000; UNCHS/UNEP, 2000; GDRC, 2000).
4.3 Outputs
The outputs from the system can loosely be labelled perception and translation (Figure 5).
Perception is the attachments of particular meanings to events or other forms of external
stimuli (see Dunn, 1981; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). For example, sustainability can be given
an exclusively environmental tag. This will directly affect the translation of the issue as
perceived. The outcome of this perception is the production of action instruments that are
solely designed to protect the environment.
Translation is the effectuation of the results of the synthesis and analysis. In the example
given above, the translation can be done through criminalising all activities that are perceived
to be harmful to sustainability, which in this case means the natural environment. This
translation is done through such instruments as by-laws, policies, plans, agendas and
directives. It is this ‘final’ activity that is normally felt by the urban population in general.
FIGURE 5. OUTPUTS OF THE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
Figure 5 reveals a complex web of processes that result in these instruments. It is an intricate
web that besides relying on the players involved in decision-making and negotiation, also
draws much of its ‘inspiration’ from perception and feedback. Even the resultant instruments
are sometimes not the conclusion of the matter. Before, during or after enforcement feedback
can have ‘a say’ in this web and trigger off another round of activity. This usually happens
when it is perceived or realised (usually by the decision-makers) that the instrument is not
having the desired effect or when its crafters believe it can be adjusted to perform better. This
iteration sets off another sequence of processing, perception, translation and feedback.
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5 URBAN POVERTY AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN HARARE: A PREVIEW
5.1 Urban poverty
Since the adoption of the first wave of economic reforms in 1991 urban poverty has been on
an upward swing in Zimbabwe. More than three in four (75.6%) Zimbabweans are classified
as poor while 47.2 are very poor4 (ZCTU, 1999). The proportion of the poor is a 43 percent
increase from 52.8 percent in 1991 (CSO, 1998). It represents an increase of over 25 percent
from the 1995 figure which was below 60 percent (Nyakazeya, 2000). It is not surprising
therefore that every three in five (63%) of the urban residents of Zimbabwe are poor. The
official urban poverty line in Zimbabwe is set at over Z$16,9805 (CCZ, 2001). The magnitude
is made clear when it is remembered that the 1995 urban poverty line was Z$2,213.28
(MPSLSW, 1997). At that time 54 percent of the urban residents were poor. Half of these
were classified as very poor, meaning that their incomes were insufficient to access the basic
food items as represented by the basic food basket. Table 2 summarises the growth of poverty
in Harare between 1995 and 2001.
Table 2: The growth of poverty in Harare
Proportion of population (percent)Category
1995 20016
Very Poor 21 32.3
Poor 20 30.7
Non-poor 59 37
Sources: MPSLSW, 1997; CCZ, 2001
5.1.1 The faces of poverty in Harare
This section examines how urban poverty manifests itself in Harare. It combines the
manifestations relating to basic necessities, activities and circumstances. Figure 6 examines
the issue of location. The diagram illustrates the ubiquitous nature of urban poverty in Harare.
It is everywhere. Geographically most people afflicted with various kinds of poverty come
from and/or reside in the high-density areas (HDAs) and informal or squatter settlements.
Some pockets of urban poverty exist in the Central Business District where the main feature is
vagrancy, homelessness and the increasing phenomenon of street children. Poverty is also
invading unlikely parts of the urban landscape such as industrial areas, the middle-density
areas (MDAs) and low-density areas (LDAs). This is especially so among pensioners,
widows, orphans, domestic workers, squatters and homeless wanderers who colonise open
spaces and/or fragile land as well as bridges, or seldom used buildings. Table 3 captures the
exact nature of the poverty afflicting these people. It also presents estimates of the numbers in
each category.
                                                  
4 In Zimbabwe the poor are people who earn incomes below the Total Consumption Poverty Line (TCPL), while
the very poor earn below the Food Poverty Line (FPL).
5 At the time of writing US$1 = Z$55
6 Calculation based on CCZ figures.
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FIGURE 6: FACES OF POVERTY IN HARARE – LOCATIONAL ASPECTS
Table 3: Glimpses into Harare’s poor
Location Nature Who? Proportion
(%)
High-density areas  ¨ Income absence or inadequacy
 ¨ Inadequate housing
 ¨ Vulnerability
 ¨ Decreasing access to basic services
 ¨ Lodgers
 ¨ Retrenchees
 ¨ Retirees
 ¨ female headed households
 ¨ Orphans
40
Pockets in MDAs
and LDAs
 ¨ Homelessness
 ¨ Inadequate incomes
 ¨ Depreciating incomes
 ¨ Increasing vulnerability
 ¨ Loss of employment
 ¨ Domestic workers
 ¨ Security guards
 ¨ Pensioners
 ¨ Vagrants
8
Squatters
(permanent)
 ¨ Homelessness
 ¨ Voicelessness
 ¨ Powerlessness
 ¨ Income absence or inadequacy
 ¨ Lack of access to basic services
 ¨ Unemployed
 ¨ Evicted
 ¨ Retired
 ¨ Retrenched
 ¨ Poorly paid
5
Informal settlements
(official Transit
Camps)
 ¨ Homelessness
 ¨ Lack of access to basic services
 ¨ Voicelessness
 ¨ Powerlessness
 ¨ Income absence or inadequacy
 ¨ Ex-squatters
 ¨ Evictees
2
Unauthorised
settlements, public
places, riverbanks,
 ¨ Homelessness
 ¨ Voicelessness
 ¨ Powerlessness
 ¨ Income absence or inadequacy
 ¨ Lack of access to basic services
 ¨ Exclusion
 ¨ Unemployed
 ¨ Evicted
 ¨ Retired
 ¨ Retrenched
 ¨ Poorly paid
 ¨ Vagrants
5
CBD  ¨ Homelessness
 ¨ Voicelessness
 ¨ Powerlessness
 ¨ Income absence or inadequacy
 ¨ Lack of access to basic services
 ¨ Exclusion
 ¨ Vagrants
 ¨ Street children
 ¨ Street homeless
 ¨ Temporary street dwellers
1
High-density
areas (HDAs)
Unauthorise
d
settlements
LOCATING
THE POOR
Central
Business
District (CBD)
Transit (Holding)
Camps
Public
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Public open
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Sources: Research findings, 2000–01; Estimates also based on CSO, 1998; Mubvami and Hall, 2000;
DSHZ/ZIHOPFE, 2000.
As shown in the table there is a ‘rich’ diversity in the experience of poverty in Harare. It
ranges from the obviously poor in the shacks and streets to the hidden poor in the middle and
high-income residential areas and institutions. Most of them are already poor, but some are
clearly at risk as incomes become eroded and assets are seized or sold involuntarily to make
up for immediate needs and commitments which current levels of existing incomes are unable
to satisfy. The fact that current incomes are less than 10 percent of the 1991 levels (Zimbabwe
Independent, 2001) is a harbinger of worse things to come (Daily News, 08 October, 2001).
In addition to incomes and consumption it can be seen that the affected people, especially
those in unrecognised or unauthorised settlements, are also affected by the inadequacy or
unavailability of services particularly education, sanitation and health. They are also victims of
powerlessness and voicelessness which adversities combine to exclude them from
mainstream socio-political and economic processes.
5.2 Environmental issues in Harare
Until recently Harare was indeed ‘The Sunshine City’. The streets were clean, the water was
not a subject of debate, garbage was regularly collected and the quality of the air was not a
source of alarm. Services and utilities were arguably a cut above most of sub-Saharan Africa.
Things have not deteriorated that much but the suspension of the whole council by the
Minister of Local Government and National Housing in 1999 was a clear indication that the
capital’s reputation was at stake as the quality of the city took a tumble (Daily Mail &
Guardian, 26 February, 1999). Most conspicuous in the decline of the city is the state of the
environment. Table 4 shows the topical environmental issues in Harare.
The table reveals disturbing developments in the ecological profile of the city. There is
scarcely a facet of the environment that is left unscathed. From the tangible like water to the
highly abstract like amenity things are as it were ‘falling apart’. The table does admit that
some of the ‘badness’ has not reached crisis proportions. The water is still safe by WHO
standards. Some aspects of atmospheric pollution, for example the levels of sulphur dioxides
are still within acceptable limits (Santren, 2001). The same applies to the degradation of soils
and, by national and regional comparisons, the siltation of water bodies (cf. Gumbo, 1997).
However, as Table 4 shows there is reason for serious concern. The city’s water is slowly
becoming undrinkable unless expensive purification processes are undertaken, an aspect
which is increasingly becoming doubtful considering the state of the national economy.7 The
greenbelt surrounding the city is fast becoming a luxury as woodlands are decimated (E2000,
2001). Adding to this the appearance and increase of irritations like the ubiquitous eyesores,
stench and the cacophony resulting from noise and chaos leads to the conclusion that the city
is losing its glamour. The question then would be who is responsible?
The generally accepted diagnosis is that the poor are largely responsible (see E2000, 2001a;
Gumbo, 1997). It is what the poor do that is leading to the collapse of a once solid and
enviable environmental profile. This enquiry revealed that the poor through their practices are
deemed to be responsible for atmospheric pollution, for chemical pollution, for eyesores, for
the stench, for siltation and for poisoning water sources. It is agreed though that some ‘high-
                                                  
7 In fact the city almost ran out of chlorine in early 2001. Government was forced to allow local authorities
access to strictly rationed foreign currency, which they now share with the oil and power utilities.
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tech’ pollution by the ‘not-so-poor’ is responsible for atmospheric pollution, effluent
discharges into the rivers and loss of amenity through negligence (Table 4).
Table 4: Environmental concerns in the City of Harare
Sector Issue Popular diagnosis Comments
Water  ¨ Increased levels of organic
pollutants in major sources of
water. Still safe by WHO
standards, but getting worse.
 ¨ Rising phosphate and nitrate
levels
 ¨ Occasional mass fish death
 ¨ Water treatment difficulties
 ¨ Hyacinth infestations
 ¨ Industry,
 ¨ Urban agriculture
 ¨ Colonisation of
catchment are by
squatters
Industry is the biggest polluter.
Low fines and lax enforcement
Not mentioned are the
discharges from sewerage work
operated by the local authority
and the neighbouring
Chitungwiza municipality and
chemicals used by commercial
farms
Deforestation  ¨ Disappearing woodlands within
the city and in surrounding areas
 ¨ Wood poaching by low-
income groups for sale
and use
Correct diagnosis. Exacerbated
by shortage and high cost of
paraffin, costly electricity, and
lack of electricity in some parts
as well as growing illegal
settlements and official slums
(TCs)
Atmosphere  ¨ Increased pollution
 ¨ SO2 emission (80ug/m
3) still within
WHO standards, but getting
worse.
 ¨ Air pollution levels above who limit
of 50mg/m3
 ¨ Wood fuel,
 ¨ Vehicle emissions
 ¨ Industry
Firewood use has its own
causes (see above).
Over 400,000 cars on the load
main course
Not mentioned unavailability (or
high cost) of unleaded fuel
Solid waste
management
 ¨ Pollution of the landscape by
rubbish paper, plastic, cans, food
leftovers, uncollected and tipped
bins
 ¨ Local authority
negligence,
 ¨ Residents in formal and
informal settlements,
 ¨ Vagrants,
 ¨ Street children
Often not cited is dumping by
industries, oil companies,
garages, filling stations, large
retail outlets, hospitals and other
institutions
Soil degradation  ¨ Loss of soils by water or wind  ¨ Urban agriculture
through cultivation
along stream banks, hill
slopes cultivation,
 ¨ deforestation
Flagrant and sometimes
politicise violation of standing
regulations. Not mentioned is
settlement in fragile lands
sometimes authorised by
authorities
Siltation of rivers  ¨ Loss of water sources by soils  ¨ Soils from the above See above
Stench  ¨ Linked to solid waste management  ¨ Rotting garbage As above
Loss of amenity  ¨ The increase in eyesores e.g.
rubbish dumps, shacks, ageing
and neglected buildings
 ¨ Growth of unauthorised
settlements,
 ¨ Owner negligence,
 ¨ High renovation, costs,
 ¨ Regulated rentals
Often ignored are the
dilapidated office blocks in the
city centre
Noise  ¨ Not a major concern
Sources: Research findings, 2000–01; Gumbo, 1997; ZNOL, 1997; Madava, 2000; Civitas2004, 2001;
E2000, 2001, 2001a; Santren, 2001
Figures often quoted ad nauseam include the more than 400,000 cars on Harare’s roads and
the 2,000,000 litres of mostly leaded fuel consumed a day (cf. E2000, 2001). Other facts
include the pollution of Manyame and Mukuvisi rivers by ‘rational’ industrialists who would
rather pay a small fine than be saddled with the high costs associated with safe disposal of
effluent (ZNOL, 1997). Often cited too is the ‘rational’ neglect of maintenance because the
government imposes rent controls resulting in landlords not being able to earn enough to care
for the buildings.
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5.2.1 The contribution of the poor to environmental damage
From Table 4 it can be seen that Harare’s environment is under assault from all sections of the
city’s community. Virtually every resident and institution in the city plays a part in the
destruction of the environment. Thus individuals, households, the public sector and the
private sector acting in various capacities are, in one way or the other, culprits in the
deterioration of the capital’s environmental profile. For their part, the poor sections of the
urban community, as shown in Table 3 and Figure 6, also make a significant contribution to
the upsurge and intensification of the environmental maladies afflicting Harare.
5.2.1.1 Deforestation
When poverty and the environment are mentioned together the plundering of trees in and
around the city almost always tops the discussion (E2000, 2000a). Harare’s greenbelt is no
longer green. Large proportions of the poor residents in the formal (>30%) and informal
(>80%) settlements use wood as their main source of energy for cooking and, to a lesser
extent, heating. Some have taken the opportunity to generate income by selling illegally
acquired firewood to urban residents in both high and low-income areas. There are over 200
illegal permanent firewood dealers operating openly in Harare. Many more are engaged in
sporadic and/or clandestine operations. Having exhausted what can be safely poached from
within the city, the illicit firewood dealers have turned their attention to surrounding farms
and further afield. Fetching an average of Z$20 a bundle (about 4kg) wood is a lucrative form
of business.
Beginning in 1999 the situation was worsened by the shortage of nation-wide paraffin and
subsequent frequent fuel price hikes. In mid-2001 the predictable hikes culminated in a 600
percent increase in the price of the vital fuel, pushing it further away from the reach of most
low-income residents. Electricity, the alternative to paraffin, does not come cheap either. The
sole national power utility (ZESA) has government permission to increase tariffs every
quarter, indefinitely. Moreover, there are formal residential areas of the city where the voltage
provided is not enough to power cooking appliances. To complicate matters the appliances
are themselves very costly compared to the incomes of the residents.8 Out in the informal
settlements, both authorised and unauthorised, the products of stolen wood have an added
use as construction materials. As can be seen deforestation, which is rampant among the
poor, is a result of reinforcing conditions and processes, some of them structural, operating
among all sections of the residents, with the most negative effects being felt among the poor.
5.2.1.2 Atmospheric and water pollution
The air is another victim of the ‘harmful’ activities of Harare’s poor. As noted above the poor
are blamed for using firewood for energy. The smoke issuing therefrom is cited in some
authoritative sources as a major polluter of the atmosphere (cf. E2000, 2000; Santren, 2001).
The background issues to firewood usage have been discussed above. However, there has
been no attempt to quantify the exact contribution of the poor compared to the ‘high-tech’
pollution by industry and vehicles.
Perhaps the most celebrated villainy of the poor is in the water resource sector. The
misdemeanours are committed in several respects:
¨ Chemical pollution through fertilisers and pesticides used in urban agriculture.
                                                  
8 At the time of writing the cheapest hot-plate on the market cost more than four times the monthly salary of more
than 50% of the working population (cf. Nyakazeya, 2001).
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¨ Wood felling, stream bank and hill slope cultivation all of which lead to the loosening of
soils which are then washed away into water sources leading to siltation, decreased
volumes and the eventual loss of water bodies.
¨ Illegal abstraction of pit and river sand for sale and construction, an activity that has the
same impact as the removal of vegetation cover.
¨ Settling in ecologically fragile areas, mainly river catchment areas, including riverbanks
resulting in the washing of topsoil and all sorts of waste products into streams and rivers.
¨ The deliberate use of chemicals to kill fish, which end up killing all life in the water and
rendering the water undrinkable and uninhabitable for a long time.
This indeed is a strong indictment. And every bit of it is true. Some activities mentioned
above in connection with the fluvial and hydrological damage begin with the dislodging of
soils. This is done through settlement, farming, wood-poaching and illegal sand abstraction.
The last two activities leave permanent scars on the landscape creating eyesores and health
hazards.
5.2.1.3 Loss of amenity and overloading of facilities
Loss of amenity happens when ‘nasty’ views replace ‘scenic’ sights. In addition to the
landscape scars arising from sand abstraction mentioned above the poor are known to build
‘unsightly’ structures which themselves are illegal. In the formal settlements backyard shacks
outnumber legal structures five to one. More than half a million people live in these structures.
Occupancy rates per stand are several times the design capacity (see below). In the informal
settlements both authorised and unauthorised the situation is even worse as residents there
use temporary structures in keeping with their ‘temporary’ status.
The overloading of services is one of the reasons why the city cannot perform its
responsibilities effectively. Mbare, the poorest and oldest HDA has an average of 13 families
occupying one 200-square metre stand originally intended for one family of no more than six
people (SDI, 2000). Some stands have as much as 40 people, some of whose structures
illegally encroach onto the road (Mashavira, 1999). They share one toilet, one water point and
one mains outlet. In the oft condemned hostels9 in the same suburb an average of eight
people share one room of no more than 10m2. All this is done in contravention of the
provisions of the city’s building, public health, sanitation and safety by-laws.
This brazen overcrowding sets off ripple effects that are felt throughout the urban system.
Water and sewerage services are overloaded resulting in frequent blockages, spillage,
persistent stench and threats to public health and safety. This is because the design capacity of
the water and sewerage services in the affected areas has been exceeded sometimes by as
much as nine times. Due to this overload, the city’s water treatment and sewerage works are
strained and occasionally break down. The breakdown of the over-stretched sewer treatment
works are responsible for some of the pollution of the water bodies (Gumbo, 1997). Since
1998 Harare’s water pumping capacity has started to feel the pressure resulting in instances
where some areas sporadically go without water for days on end, an occurrence hitherto
unheard of in Zimbabwe. Overcrowding in the face of heavily subsidised water and inefficient
cost recovery are thus responsible for some adversities beyond residential areas.
                                                  
9 On more than one occasion the city’s Director of Health has condemned the hostels declaring them unfit for
human habitation. They continue to be occupied amid regular and unfulfilled promises of renovation.
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The poverty-stricken residents are also notorious for their carelessness in dumping or
scattering solid waste. This they do right in the heart of residential areas and the city centre.
This practice compounds problems of stench, unsightliness and public health. Whereas those
in various kinds of shelters dump wastes, the homeless and street children tamper with bins
and loose garbage in their daily scavenging routines. Consequently, in both formal and
informal settlements, in the city centre and on the river banks there are piles of dumped
wastes and tipped bins. The city’s growing incapacity to manage solid waste is not making the
situation any easier (Mubvami and Wekwete, 2000).
5.2.2 The poor and the environment: a re-appraisal
Table 5 captures the villainous activities of the poor that adversely affect environmental
sustainability in Harare. It puts facts and figures behind the accusations and conclusions. Box
7 presents the picture from one of the official Transit (or Holding) Camps set up to
temporarily resettle squatters who had been rounded up by the authorities in 1994 as a
“permanent solution” to their shelter problems “was being found” (DSHZ/ZIHOPFE, 2000).
BOX 7: HOW TO CREATE AN OFFICIAL SLUM?– AN
OVERVIEW OF HATCLIFFE EXTENSION
Established in 1994 to accommodate people removed from
Churu farm, Hatcliffe Extension has seen itself grow from a
Transit Camp into something resembling the sprawling squatter
settlements elsewhere in Africa. Below are some statistics for
the camp.
Aspect Figure
Number of families 2,219
Population 13,015
Occupancy 6 per room
Families per borehole 554
People per toilet 2,006
Source: ZIHOPFE/DSHZ, 2000: 16
There is no doubt that the poor do engage in practices that endanger urban sustainability.
However there are underlying reasons why the practices continue and even expand. The role
of ‘third parties’ as shown in the table is significant. This contributory role is shown in the last
column of Table 5. There are five principal ways in which other actors aid and abet the poor in
their improprieties:
1. The existence and creation of a ready market for products such as those from urban
agriculture, illegal tree-felling and illegal sand abstraction.
2. The payment by higher income groups of unemployed people among the poor to commit
crimes like resource poaching and illicit farming practices.
3. Tolerance and implicit encouragement when no enforcement is done in cases of illegal
urban agriculture, backyard shacks and wood poaching.
4. Undertaking official programmes that ‘borrow’ from initiatives of the poor, an example
being the Transit Camps which to all intents and purposes can be described as a bad copy
of the original squatter settlements (see Box 7).
5. Indirect complicity through certain policies or actions, for example those relating to fuel,
power and taxes imposed on safer and more benign alternatives such as electric stoves.
It is notable that among the ‘accomplices’ and ‘co-accused’ are virtually all sections of the
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urban community. Included in the list are ‘non-poor’ residents and households, the private
sector as well as local and central government. Although mainstream civil society does not
feature in the equation it may well be accused of complicity by virtue of its membership and
its interaction with the local authority and central government (Kamete, 1997; see below).
Besides being guilty by commission and association civil society has without doubt
committed errors of omission (see below).
Table 5: Villains at work? What the poor do to deserve the tag
Activity Facts and figures Accomplices
 ¨ Urban agriculture  ¨ 1990 – 8 % of city area
 ¨ 1994 – 16% of city area
 ¨ 2001 – 25% of city area
 ¨ More than 50% illegal10
 ¨ More than 30% on slopes and stream
banks and fragile land
 ¨ 60% cultivated by the poor
 ¨ 75% use chemical fertilisers
 ¨ >90% grow for household consumption
 ¨ 40% practised by the non-poor
 ¨ 90% of this illegal
 ¨ 60% of these encroach onto stream banks and
slopes
 ¨ 100% of them use chemical fertilisers
 ¨ All of these grow for sell, though some produce is
also set aside for domestic consumption
 ¨ Deforestation  ¨ Loss estimated at 4 hectares a year
 ¨ About 200 dealers in the open
 ¨ Most prevalent around low-income areas
and informal settlements
 ¨ About 70% of dealers employed to poach
 ¨ Urban residents provide a market
 ¨ Some official settlements (TCs) replicating the
problem.
 ¨ Shortage of and high cost of paraffin (600% hike
in 2001)
 ¨ Shortage of and high cost of electricity (about
15% increase every quarter)
 ¨ Costly electrical appliances
 ¨ Import duty and sales tax contribute to high cost.
 ¨ Sand poaching  ¨ 10% done by the poor for own building
 ¨ 90% for sell
 ¨ >50% of poachers employed to do poach
 ¨ Ready market among middle and high-income
earners
 ¨ 60% sold on sites offered by or in full view of city
officials
 ¨ No certification process
 ¨ Informal
settlements and
illegal structures
 ¨ 10% of city population stay in illegal
settlements
 ¨ 13.6% of these along river banks
 ¨ 48.6% in permanent squatter
settlements
 ¨ 93% of all stands in HDAs have illegal
outbuildings
 ¨ Half the 12,056 tuckshops illegal
 ¨ 40% of city population are lodgers in
these shacks
 ¨ 2.2% legally settled by government in 3 Transit
Camps
 ¨ Government settlement located on catchment
area of major river
 ¨ TCs more overcrowded
 ¨ TCs worse in service provision and less healthy
than unauthorised settlements (see ratios in Box
7)
6 THE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM AT WORK: INPUTS, PROCESSES AND
OUTPUTS
Having set the scene and shown the picture as it obtains on the ground, the following sections
will now turn to issues of governance. The purpose is to evaluate how and why the system of
governance has responded to the environmental and poverty scenario as depicted above. The
analysis is based on sustained observations of the system over a four-year period.
6.1 A closer look at the inputs
Table 6 traces the source of inputs into the system of governance and what treatment was
accorded those input. The table traces the source and fate of the 58 identifiable inputs that
                                                  
10 Illegal in the sense that the farming plot is not allocated by the local authority or is not designated for
agricultural use according to the operative plan.
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went into the system between 1997 and 2001. As argued in Table 1 inputs from central
government are compulsory. This is reflected in the reception they get from the system of
local governance as shown in Table 6. Outside of central government and the international
community the private sector has the highest acceptance rate despite its small proportion of
inputs. Households and individual inputs have the lowest acceptance rate. Civil society is
treated well but it also has the highest score in terms of ambivalence. It is interesting to note
that the local authority on occasions receives its own inputs with ambivalence.
Table 6: Origins and treatment of stimuli into the City of Harare (1997–2001)
Source Contribution Reception (% of own inputs)
Number Percent Acceptance Rejection Ambivalence
Central government 10 17.2 100 0 0
Local Government 6 10.3 83 0 17
Civil society
(established)
12 20.7 67 0 33
The private sector 3 5.2 100 0 0
Households 6 10.3 17 66 17
Individuals 6 10.3 17 66 17
International 15 25.9 100 0 0
Source: Research findings, 2001
Table 7 sheds light on the nature of the inputs identified. The dominance of government
agencies in regulatory inputs is to be expected. These inputs are mainly control-oriented and
take the form of statutes, policies, circulars and directives. At the local level proposed by-laws
are also fed into the system of governance as the local authority is empowered by the Urban
Councils Act to make subsidiary legislation. The latest in the list of local authority by-laws are
the City of Harare’s landmark water pollution by-laws mooted way back in 1997 to combat
pollution by increasing spot fines for a single case of confirmed pollution by over 1000
percent (ZNOL, 1997).
In this move the city council agreed with the suggestions of civil society (mainly
environmentalists) that the paltry fines then in existence were not a strong enough deterrent.
From this and a few other cases such as atmospheric pollution, it can be concluded that civil
society in the form of environmental pressure groups does get a favourable hearing in
important environmental issues. Three in four of the input from civil society is in the form of
suggestions and petitions. Other suggestions from civil society over the period in question
covered urban agriculture, illegal sand abstraction and deforestation. The single threat
captured in the table was an occasion in 1999 when environmental groups in full agreement
with central government threatened to sue the local authority over its pollution of water
bodies by means of effluent from the city’s sewerage treatment works.
The private sector has a high acceptance rate mainly because it is sparing in its contributions.
Moreover, as shown in Table 7 private sector inputs tend to lean towards the offering of
material assistance to the local authority. This is linked to corporate social responsibility,
marketing and – though they rarely admit it – tax avoidance. In contrast to the laid back
approach of the private sector households and individuals are more likely to deliver their
inputs in the form of threats, complaints and protests. In fact evidence shows that this is the
only way they believe they can get an audience with the local authority. Experience confirms
the validity of this conviction. Demonstrations were and still remain a common feature among
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groups of residents as well as individuals. The most famous ones relate to tuckshops, food
markets and ‘clean-up campaigns’11 by the city authorities.
Table 7: The nature of the stimuli
Nature (Percentage of own inputs)Source
Regulatory Conceptual Petitions Assistance Suggestion
s
Protests,
threats etc
Central government 70 10 0 0 0 20
Local Government 90 0 0 0 0 10
Civil society 0 8.3 41.7 0 33.3 16.7
The private sector 0 0 33.3 67.7 0 0
Households 0 0 012 0 0 100
Individuals 0 0 013 0 0 100
International agencies 0 80 0 20 0 0
Source: Research findings, 2001
Among the private individuals reflected in the table are prominent personalities such as
politicians or aspiring politicians, religious leaders, business tycoons and freelance activists. In
the period under review there were more than twenty politicians, religious leaders and private
residents (mostly from high-income low-density areas) who protested, issued threats or filed
complaints. Among the controversial issues they were contending against were inefficient
garbage collection, illicit urban agriculture as well as the destruction of markets and backyard
shacks by the city council. As expected, the international community dominated by bilateral
and multilateral agencies injected its inputs in the form of material and technical assistance
and concepts on ‘new’ ways of thinking and managing the city. Among the concepts they
brought in during this period are good governance, decentralisation, gender, urban
environmental management, shelter policy and poverty alleviation.
Table 8: Classification of inputs
Distribution (Percent)Source
Environmental issues Socio-economic
issues
Central government 70 30
Local Government 67 33
Civil society 87 17
The private sector 100 0
Households 0 100
Individuals 33 67
International 47 53
Source: Research findings, 2001
Table 8 shows the distribution of inputs between socio-economic and environmental issues.
Save for the international community, organisations lean heavily towards environmental
protection. On average more than three-quarters of the organisational inputs had an
                                                  
11 Clean up campaigns consist of such activities as eviction, rounding up and arresting vagrants, and the
destruction of illegal structures.
12 This refers to the primary form of the inputs. Almost all of the threats and protests have petitions and
suggestions attached to them.
13 See above footnote.
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environmental bias. Even the governmental sector appears to have this bias in its inputs. The
explanation for this is not that they do not attend to socio-economic issues. The reason is that
these societal and economic issues do not form part of the ‘normal organised agenda’ where
they are received and deliberated on. Instead such issues are mostly included in offhand
proclamations and decisions which in the end to not entail long-term commitments. The very
limited number of civil organisations with an environmental agenda or sympathetic to it
explains the distribution of their inputs as shown in the table (see Table 15). Also evident in
Table 8 is the concern of individuals and households with immediate ‘bread and butter’
issues.
6.2 Processing the input
This part of the discussion analyses what happens to stimuli if accepted. This is where a
substantial portion of the question of urban governance comes in. What structures are in
place, who are involved, who are excluded and why and what principles govern the processes
are some of the very important questions the study wanted to unravel. Figure 7 shows the
structures of urban governance in the City of Harare.
FIGURE 7: THE STRUCTURES OF GOVERNANCE IN THE CITY OF HARARE.
As shown in the diagram the local authority has two parallel structures, one political and the
other technical. The political side comprises elected councillors who represent geographic
areas known as wards. Led by an elected Executive Mayor, these politicians are a localised
version of the national legislature. They are responsible for policy making. The technical side
is responsible for the day to day running of the city and is made up of technocrats appointed
on merit. Prior to the introduction of the office of Executive Mayor in 1995 the day to day
running of the city was under the supervision of the Town Clerk, the chief executive of the
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local authority. After the changes, the Town Clerk’s Department is itself under the direct
supervision of a fulltime elected Executive Mayor.
The relationships of the officers and politicians are characterised by a wide range of formal
and informal interactions. These are further complicated by the parallel national-level
structures, in particular the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National
Housing (LGPWNH) and Members of Parliament (MP) (Figure 7). The MP represents
constituencies. The constituencies are made up of several wards. The urban governance
system thus finds itself having to answer to two types of elected representatives. The fact that
there are no guidelines detailing how national and local representatives should relate to each
other enhances the reliance on informal interactions. Sometimes this generates confusing
signals to the technocrats who in some cases have demonstrated a tendency to pit the
representatives against each other. Complicating the whole picture is the position of the
Executive Mayor who is elected by the whole city but does not sit in parliament (see
Appendix 1).
FIGURE 8: COMMITTEES OF THE HARARE CITY COUNCIL
Issues are deliberated upon in council committees (Figure 8). Only these committees can
legally come up with binding decisions that are then passed onto technical departments for
implementation. Thus, according to protocol, inputs should be channelled through the ward
councillor who will then table the motion for discussion in council chambers in full view of
the public. Technical staff headed by directors of departments under the supervision of the
Town Clerk (Table 9) will be on hand to provide explanations and give answers to issues
needing clarification. After it is tabled, an item that is accepted as warranting further
processing will be passed on to the appropriate council committee for deliberation. When it
Source: Research findings and partly based on Mubvami and Wekwete, 2000
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arrives at a decision, the committee presents that decision to the Executive Committee, which
is made up of chairpersons of all committees and is chaired by the Executive Mayor.14 If
accepted by the Executive Committee the decision of the committee is then presented before
full council for ratification through a democratic vote (Figure 9). If it gets the majority vote the
decision is adopted and becomes binding and is ready to be implemented by the technical
arm.
It has been noted that the Executive Committee sometimes exhibits some dictatorial practices
thereby becoming an elitist structure that dictates the running of the city with little regard for
the committees (Mubvami and Wekwete, 2000). The dissolution of the infamous council and
the dismissal of the Executive Mayor in 1999 was attributed in part to this flagrant usurping of
the powers of elected councillors, which ultimately created a huge mess that could only be
resolved by sacking the entire council (Appendix 1).
FIGURE 9: TRACING THE ROUTE OF INPUTS IN COUNCIL
Figure 8 provides an overview of the committees of Harare City Council (HCC). The
committees constitute an impressive suite that should be able to help in effectively governing
the city. As shown in Figure 7 technical departments (see Table 9) service the committees. In
the case of Harare, the departmental staff is very highly professionally qualified. The system
has three key characteristics that have implications for good urban governance. Firstly it is
democratically elected by registered residents. Secondly it is supervised by a central
government ministry (the MLGPWNH), which itself is a combination of professional and
political entities. Moreover, the structure allows for double representation, namely a ward
councillor who deals with issues of concern to a specific geographic area and a Member of
Parliament who represents a larger urban constituency in the national legislature. It should be
noted also that all registered residents democratically elect the Executive Mayor,15 who to all
                                                  
14 After the sacking of the mayor and his entire council in 1999 the chairperson of the commission took over as
chairperson of the Executive Committee (see Appendix 1).
15 After the dissolution of the council by the minister of LGPWNH, the policy making function is currently being
undertaken by a commission appointed by the minister. The commission operates through the committees that are
shown Figure 7.
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intents and purposes is the third and actually ‘most’16 democratically elected representative of
‘the people’.
Table 9: The technical departments of the City of Harare and their functions
Department Key responsibilities
Town Clerk Overall supervision, legal issues, estates,
City Treasury Revenue collection, financial management
City Health Public health, environmental health and health delivery
Works Land use, engineering, infrastructure, transport planning
Human Resources Personnel management
Housing and Community Services Housing delivery, management, allocations, community facilities
The third characteristic is the accessibility of the system in terms of receiving input.
Individuals, households, civil society and the private sector can present their cases to the
councillor who in turn takes it to council. Alternatively they can approach the MP who can
approach any arm of council on their behalf. They can even go through the public relations
office, the technical departments, the mayor or even the minister. The MLGPWNH has its
own Department of Local Government Promotions and Administration with a strong urban
section (Mubvami and Wekwete, 2000). The suspension in 1999 of the Executive Mayor and
the subsequent dissolution of the whole council for non-performance was an indication of the
effectiveness of this superintendence and the sensitivity of the system (Daily Mail and
Guardian, 26 February, 1999). The fact that all stakeholders including civil society and the
private sector unanimously welcomed the ministerial action is evidence of this.
The chief determinant of urban governance in Harare is the way the structures process the
inputs. The synthesis and analysis of the input are virtually closed to ‘outsiders’, meaning
here all groups and individuals who are not part of the local authority or its central
government counterparts. The processing of the inputs is limited to council and the technical
departments. Central government’s occasional intervention through the MLGPWNH
constitutes the sole non-local authority participation in the formal processes. Figure 10, which
should be read with Figure 9, gives an idea of just how closed the system is.
The diagram in Figure 10 shows that the process of analysis and synthesis is regarded as an
private inside job. In the initial and crucial stages of agenda-setting and deliberation, ‘external’
contribution is limited to informal discussions. This happens when councillors and officers
seek advice from their peers or other experts. In the case of politicians the purpose of the
informal interaction is to ‘enrich’ their contribution to debate or gauge public opinion.
Officers will be seeking to perform their task in an area they scarcely understand17 or where
they feel some useful input can be obtained. Sometimes in the latter stages some formal
external contribution may be brought in. This usually happens when consultants are
contracted to undertake some task for which council has no capacity or is too busy to
undertake. Research and planning are some of the key areas normally contracted out.
It is in council committees to which the public has no access that the fundamental decision-
making processes that ultimately determine the running of the city take place. The general
                                                  
16 The Executive Mayor is elected by the whole city in contrast to the other representatives who are elected by
parts of the city.
17 This happens when officers try to find their way in an area they know nothing about but in which councillors
demand some technical input.
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populace will only come to know of what has been going on when the outputs of the
deliberations are presented to full council, which is the only window open to the public and
the media. It is here that the public can get wind of what the governors are up to and react if
they so wish.
FIGURE 10: A LOOK AT THE PROCESSES IN THE LOCAL AUTHORITY
However, evidence shows that council meetings are not attended by the less affluent. About
95 percent of the low-income groups do not even know that council meetings are open let
alone when they are held. An observation of the chambers revealed the same faces from the
media, residents associations and analysts. Therefore once some input goes in and is accepted
what happens to it remains shrouded in mystery until the final output comes out. The average
waiting time is two months. Occasionally some ‘intermediate’ outputs do leak out through
some errant councillors or council employees.
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Since the decision outputs come from a legally constituted body and through legally
recognised processes there is normally no negotiation. Once passed the rules, regulations, by-
laws, policies and other instruments are not easily altered unless central government bulldozes
its way into the system to demand some changes, relief or further deliberations. This has
happened in controversies involving urban agriculture, illegal tuckshops and unauthorised
backyard shacks (Mbiba, 1995; Kahiya, 2001; Kamete, 2001; see below). Cases of the
governed ‘outsiders’ successfully worming their way into the processes were observed in
incidents where the governed had got wind of the nature of council deliberations through
rumours, the media, peer interaction, leaked information18 or by attending report back
sessions at full council meetings (cf. ZIHOPFE, 2001).
To sum up, apart from some outsiders’ fleeting glimpses of official decision-making processes
local authority deliberations are confined within council itself and a few privileged
stakeholders, mostly from central government and some consultancies. The overwhelming
majority of the governed become aware only when law-enforcement agents start
implementing decisions. The destruction of illegal structures and the slashing of maize by
municipal police are classic examples of residents being caught unawares (see The Financial
Gazette, 24 May, 2001).
Due to this closed nature there is very little ‘outsider’ participation in the processes. The
negotiations, bargaining and tough talk are confined to council and when needed the privilege
is extended to technical officers who, as noted by one commentator, are normally summoned
to be “grilled, blasted and roasted.” If they find their way in, individuals and groups will only
make their ‘contribution’ while remaining outside. On top of these accidental contributions
and demonstrations the governed enhance their voices through media sensations and appeals
to higher offices. There are instances when the system has given in to such pressure. However
the best that can happen is for the aggrieved parties to be allowed to state what they want or
to offer suggestions for council to look into and reconsider the matter. Environmental
pressure groups like Environment 2000 have managed to extract concessions in this way
(E2000, 2000). The combative Combined Harare Residents Association (CHRA) regularly
employs similar techniques (Daily News, 6 March, 2001, 5 October, 2001).
The foregoing analysis raises some noteworthy points. The synthesis and analysis of input is
an important aspect of problem structuring. Policy analysts argue that the definition of a
problem will influence the design of the solution (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Dunn, 1994). A
wrongly formulated problem will lead to a solution that is not suitable for the problem in
question. This leads to errors of the third type, viz., solving the wrong problem (Dunn,
1994:134). When key stakeholders are relegated to the sidelines awaiting the local authority to
carry out a diagnosis, develop a cure and prescribe it, chances of a wrongly formulated
problem are high.
Furthermore, good governance demands inclusiveness and inclusive decision making so as to
balance or reconcile competing demands (UNCHS, 2000: 9). As noted above the Sustainable
City is an Inclusive City. As indicated before exclusion from decision-making processes is an
identifying mark of poverty. Exclusion creates and exacerbates the condition of
powerlessness. In view of this it can be concluded that though there are good structures in
                                                  
18 It should be pointed out here that employees of the local authority are not allowed to discuss council business
with outsiders let alone the press. The press and public relations offices are responsible for this (see Figure 7).
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place the system of governance in Harare is not conducive to sustainable urban development
by virtue of it not being open to the majority of the urban populace outside the local
authority. Granted, occasionally it caves in under pressure but in substantial terms it still
remains fundamentally elitist.
6.3 Examining the outputs from the system
The preceding sections have attempted to examine the inputs into the urban governance
system. The discussion has also explored and evaluated the processing of those inputs. This
section takes a closer look at the system’s outputs. Figure 5 is useful for this purpose. To
illustrate the analysis and the arguments being presented detailed cases will be used from
backyard shacks, urban agriculture, resource poaching and water and atmospheric pollution.
To recapitulate, after issues are processed and there is a resolution to continue pursuing the
item, council advised by its technical team comes up with an authoritative definition of the
issue based on the perceptions of those involved in the deliberation. It is this critical phase
that will shape the response of the urban governance system as it seeks to translate its
perception into actionable programmes. The transition from perception to translation is an
iterative process that involves frequent feedback as information, arguments and ideas are
exchanges in council committees.
Table 10: Perception, definition and translation in the city of Harare
Issue Perception and Definition Translation
Tuckshops ¨ Violation of trading, planning
regulations,
¨ Environmental and health hazard
¨ Depriving council of incomes
¨ Eradication
¨ Directive to technocrats
Shacks ¨ Violation of building, public health
and safety regulations,
¨ Environmental hazard
¨ Depriving council of income
¨ Eradication
¨ Directive to technocrats
Urban Agriculture ¨ Violation of planning laws
¨ Violation of environmental and
public health legislation
¨ Increase in poverty
¨ Greed
¨ Eradicate illegal and dangerous
¨ Direct genuine cases of need to
legal and environmentally safe
locations
¨ Enforce existing environmental and
planning policies
Resource poaching ¨ Theft perpetrated by criminals ¨ Step up arrests and prosecution
Water pollution ¨ Environmental hazard,
¨ Greed
¨ Low fines
¨ Eradication
¨ More stringent by-laws
Atmospheric
pollution
¨ Increase in wood fires
¨ Increase in vehicle numbers
¨ Prosecute cases of wood poaching
¨ Use persuasion for vehicles
¨ Awareness campaign for vehicle
owners
Table 10 summarises the perceptions of council and the definitions of issues adopted by the
local authority in addressing the most contentious issues on the agenda. In dealing with illegal
tuckshops, for example, council, on the advice of planners and environmental groups,
discerned nothing more than a violation of standing regulations on planning, public health and
environmental management. Council also discovered that the proliferation of these illegal
structures was depriving it of revenue while undeservedly benefiting from council services
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(Daily News, 30 May, 2001). The conclusion was that the existence of these structures was a
crime and had to be addressed like all other crimes. This perception was translated into
instruments whose primary goal was the eradication of the perceived nuisance. Virtually
overnight a directive was issued to the technocrats to destroy the structures without notice.
The municipal police, protected by the state riot squad moved in and started a two-day
demolition campaign in which over 500 illegal structures were destroyed (The Financial
Gazette, 24 May, 2001). Virtually the same scenario was repeated in council’s handling of
backyard shacks (ZIHOPFE, 2001; see Table 10).
Figure 10 suggests that the governed, who are normally excluded from the shaping of the
eventual programme of action, do make responses that eventually filter into the system. As
noted above these ‘victims of exclusion’ make a two-pronged presentation to the institutions
of governance focussing on the city council and central government. This is an additional
arsenal to their traditional forms of responses in public forums and through opinion makers,
particularly the media.
When council launched its demolition blitz in March 2001, there was an outcry. There were at
least 15 recorded public demonstrations and one petition to the government, one to the local
authority and an international appeal through the media and the Internet (ACHR, 2001; Daily
Telegraph, 30 March, 2001; Justgiving, 2001). Government then weighed in ordering the
commission to stop the destruction or go (Kahiya, 2001). This added to the international and
local outcry that forced council to review its policy. It came out with a revised action plan that
echoed what had been raised by the ‘outsiders’ about livelihoods and employment. In what
amounted to an honourable retreat in the face of irresistible feedback (Figure 5), council
agreed to regularise the tuckshops while insisting that some of them would still have to go. A
new set of regulations was put in place about the number, location, size and taxing of the new
regularised tuckshops (Daily News, 30 May, 2001).
Table 11: The fallout from decision outputs: feedback and review (and retreat?)
Issue Fallout Response Action
Tuckshop ¨ Widespread campaigns
¨ Government
intervention
¨ Reprocessing
¨ ‘New’ perception
¨ Retranslating
¨ Regularisation
Shacks ¨ As above ¨ Reprocessing, ‘New’
perception
¨ Reprieve
Urban
agriculture
¨ Pressure to change by-
laws and planning
regulations
¨ Under review ¨ ‘Unofficial’ reprieve
¨ Laxity in
enforcement
Resource
poaching
¨ Isolated appeals for
council to see big
picture (see Table 4)
¨ Unaltered ¨ Same
¨ Poorly enforced
Water pollution ¨ Appeals to descend on
industry and self
¨ Promises,
¨ threats to polluters,
¨ Threats of more
stringent measures
¨ Same
¨ Poorly enforced
Atmospheric
pollution
¨ None ¨ Unaltered ¨ Same
¨ Strong media
campaign with
E2000
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A more toned down review was made with respect to the backyard shacks. In this case
council agreed to stop the destruction but did not go so far as to regularise them. In this
response council seems to have agreed with demonstrators, petitioners and campaigners that
it was treating causes rather than symptoms. There was tacit recognition of the validity of the
argument that the 500,000 who would lose their accommodation would, in the absence of a
viable alternative, just relocate within the city’s boundaries (Justgiving, 2001).
The responses to council’s other resolutions are summarised in Table 11.19 The table shows
that the governors have made some concessions where the fallout has been intense. Some
changes have been official and explicit, while the majority appears to have been reflected in a
reluctance or inability to enforce decisions. Urban agriculture and resource poaching are good
examples of cases where the local authority exhibited some kind of ‘enforcement paralysis’
(Box 8).
7 RECONCILIATION AND MEDIATION
This section will focus on examining how broad-based the system of governance has been. It
has already been pointed out that as far as deliberations are concerned the system of
governance is a tightly closed unit and those who find their way in, do so by sneaking in,
‘bursting in’, or in the case of central government, authoritatively stepping in to assert its
legally enshrined power. This part of the discussion provides a more detailed analysis of how
the system has attempted to “…balance, reconcile and trade off…competing interests”
(UNCHS, 2000: 9), especially between environmental and social concerns.
Table 12: The contents of outputs from the system by sector
PRE- AND POST-REVIEW CONTENTS (3 = Present)
Tuckshops Shacks Agriculture Air Water Sand Wood
CONCERNS
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
ENVIRONMENTAL
Public health 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Public safety 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Planning standards 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Scenic value 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Degradation 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
FINANCIAL
Revenue loss 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Deterrence 3 3 3 3 3 3
SOCIO-ECONOMIC
Employment creation 3
Poverty alleviation 3 3
Making a living 3 3 3
Greed as motivation 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
FUNDAMENTAL CAUSE
Diagnosed 3 3 3 3 3 3
Source: Research findings
                                                  
19 The table is to be read with Figure 5 and Table 10.
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Table 12 provides an overview of council decisions as they were initially produced and what
they were after some review, if any. Table 13 analyses ‘decision shapers’ and ‘agitators’. The
former are those who actually participate in the decision-making process and whose
contribution is actually taken on board. Agitators are those who protest, usually in reaction to
a decision they feel is targeted against them. The pre-review and post review concerns were
arrived at by examining the contents of specific deliberations, decisions and the resultant
policy instruments produced.
An analysis of the contents of the decision outputs in Table 12 reveals a leaning towards
environmental protection. In fact five of the seven components (71.2%) contained the entire
standard environmental arguments and prescriptions on public health, safety, planning
(mainly on infrastructure), scenic value and degradation. Only concerns relating to urban
agriculture and atmospheric pollution lacked the full complement. Even these featured four of
the five standard concerns. The ‘post-review’ column of Table 12 shows that even after
reviewing its stance council did not relax its environmental line. Council’s normal
compromise has been to incorporate some concerns raised by some agitators into its already
designed programme (Table 13). Another observation to be drawn from Table 12 is that with
the exception of urban agriculture council’s initial conviction is that socio-economic issues are
of very little consequence, if any.
Table 13: ‘Shapers’ and ‘agitators’
Pre-review Post-reviewIssue
Shapers Agitators Shapers Agitators
Tuckshop Local authority Opinion makers Government, Local
authority
Environmental
groups Civil society,
households,
individuals
Backyard
Shacks
Local authority Homeless people’s
and civil society,
international
community,
Government, Local
authority
Industry, commerce
Urban
agriculture
Local authority Individuals, Groups Local authority Individuals, Groups
Sand
poaching
Local authority,
central government
Individuals,
environmental
groups
Local authority, central
government
Individuals,
environmental groups
Wood
poaching
Local authority,
central government
Individuals,
environmental
groups
Local authority, central
government
Individuals,
environmental groups
Water
pollution
Local authority,
central government
Environmental
groups, residents
association,
commentators
Local authority, central
government
Environmental
groups,
commentators
residents
association,
Atmospheric
pollution
Local authority,
Central government
Environmental
groups
Local authority, central
government
Environmental groups
Environmental
groups
Source: Research findings
Inevitably there have been angry reactions characterised by widespread agitation from various
sections of the urban community (Tables 11 and 13). After these disturbances, the system has
tended to wake up to the reality on the ground. It is after this agitation that the system has in
many cases remoulded its decisions by expanding its view. This it has done by
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acknowledging socio-economic concerns while still clinging onto its initial designs.
Tuckshops are a good example. In some cases (for example, backyard shacks) council has
stuck to its guns by not altering its initial design, deciding instead to grant a reprieve, which
one commentator compares to a stay of execution.
A profile of the shapers and agitators sheds additional light on the observations raised above.
Concerns are more likely to be heard if they originate from organised groups than if they
come from individuals. For their part, individual concerns are more likely to be heard if they
are put across by ratepayers. This in essence excludes the homeless and the poor in low-
income areas, as these do not pay rates.20 This non-rate-paying status of the poor also works
against the poor in other more subtle ways. For example the CHRA whose mandate is to
represent ratepayers rarely takes up issues affecting people who do not have a stake in the
city. The stake is always defined in material terms with the ownership of real estate property
being the foremost criterion. Indeed, the CHRA regularly teams up with environmentalist to
complain about the misdeeds of the poor.
All but four (more than 71%) of the 14 organised groups known to have engaged council are
environmental pressure groups or interest groups whose concerns were entirely
environmental. Of the four groups with socio-economic bias two (AAG and ZITOA) hardly
qualify as civil society. They lack both focus and cohesion. They are to all intents and
purposes a registered assortment of individuals who come together to add an emotive black
empowerment flavour to on-going controversies (Table 14; cf. Dube, 2001).
Apart from agitation and the occasional review of decisions there is no real mediation in the
management of the common affairs of the city. Instead of mediation there may be revision,
which revision as stressed above is nothing more than a reluctant inclusion of other
viewpoints and needs in the ‘redesigning’ of council’s urban management instruments. Only
the loud and influential are capable of causing agitation that can be noticed and acted upon.
As noted, even when reacting to ‘external’ noise and disgruntlement the system still remains
closed, opening up only to allow itself to go out get the cause and sense of the displeasure,
walk back in and close the door. Once again safely behind the closed doors the local authority
still has the monopoly of deciding what to do in the face of the agitation. Only the minister
can get an audience and a real meeting where some ‘meaningful discussion’ can take place.
At least once in early 2001 the minister took some sections of the governed with him to Town
House and forced a meeting with the chairman of the commission.21 However, commentators
agree that this was nothing more than ‘political posturing’ (Kahiya, 2001). To label the
encounter between the minister and the commission as mediation would be a
misrepresentation. The minister dictated terms, gave an ultimatum and unilaterally set up a
committee, appointed wholly by himself, to regularise the structures. At the meeting in
question the chairman of the commission running the city “…was told to stop the
destruction” (Kahiya, 2001). Predictably, the minister’s demands and prescriptions brushed
aside environmental concerns and elevated socio-economic issues above anything else. The
                                                  
20Homeowners in high-density, low-income areas pay ‘supplementary charges’. These are flat fees, which bear no
relationship to the value of property.
21 This was the pick of the tuckshops and shacks controversy. The minister took with him members of the ZITOA
and the AAG.
37
constitution of the appointed committee22 strongly implies that environmental concerns are to
be subservient to the socio-economic needs of the tuckshop owners.
Table 14: Shapers and agitators: the groups
ENVIRONMENTAL BIAS SOCIO ECONOMIC BIAS
1. Environment 2000 1. Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation
2. Combined Harare Residents Association 2. Civic Forum on Housing
3. Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce 3. Zimbabwe Tuckshop Owners Association
4. Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries 4. Affirmative Action Group
5. National Property Owners Association
6. Inner-city Partnerships
7. Retail Association of Zimbabwe
8. Zimbabwe Institute of Regional and Urban
Planners
9. Harare Advocacy Centre
10. Real Estate Institute of Zimbabwe
In the absence of meaningful mediation there is no effort at reconciling “competing interest
and priorities” (UNCHS, 2000: 9) in the management of the city’s common affairs. This lack
of “broad-based local governance” (UNCHS/UNEP, 2000: 2) is a result of the deliberate
exclusion of all stakeholders outside the ranks of the governors. Observations of the system
suggest that the void in reconciling competing interests has three explanations. The first one is
that the system does not believe that there are real enlightened competing interests ‘out there’.
What the system basically believes in is a unitary interest and that in urban planning and
management terms is the public interest. The second explanation is based on the conviction
that allowing ‘controversy’ onto the agenda would add unnecessary strain to processes that
should yield speedy results. Finally the system believes it is entrusted with the responsibility
of carving a path for the city and for this it is legally authorised and amply qualified to
determine what the valid interests are and to rally the city behind its informed and legitimate
decisions.
8 URBAN GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABILITY IN HARARE: EMERGING
ISSUES
While the focus of the critique has been on the capital, the preceding analysis is applicable to
the whole of urban Zimbabwe. The same structures and processes discussed here obtain in all
urban centres. The conclusions reached here are therefore valid for all the 24 urban centres
governed by the Urban Councils Act.
The discussions has stressed that the attainment of urban sustainability will depend on the
outputs of the system, which outputs, as has been shown, depend on what goes into the
system and how it is processed. Empirical evidence suggests that the spirited pursuit for urban
sustainability in Harare is fundamentally flawed as it lacks the support of processes and
mechanisms that can allow the management of the city’s common affairs to be “participatory,
transparent and accountable” (UNDP, 1997: 4). This may mean that the city is moving away
from sustainability. The following sections will try to put this assertion into perspective.
                                                  
22 The committee is made up of activists from the AAG and ZITOA. None of the committee members has any
interest in environmental issues.
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8.1 The structures, processes and outputs
An analysis of the institutional structures of governance reveals an impressive array of state,
civil society and private sector stakeholders who if they so wish can interact and work
together. A look at the institutions of local governance shows that the system is well
structured in terms of the political decision making arm as well as the technical decision
execution side. In terms of organisation the system is indeed ripe for democratic governance
and accountability. The integration of checks and balances through elected representatives at
the national level and the fact that this supervision is endowed with both technical and
political attributes (the MLGPWNH and the MPs) makes the system of governance well
suited not only to manage but also to govern the city.
The problem of governance lies with how the system is operated. It is here that observers
cannot help questioning the seemingly solid structures, which at face value should be
conducive for good urban governance. The city’s diversity as reflected in the multiplicity and
variety of civil society and private organisations is literally shut out when it comes to the
actual management of the city’s affairs. Evidence shows that after receiving inputs mainly
through ‘normal’ channels the system believes it can handle the stimuli on its own.
Admittedly, it does allow its members to occasionally sneak out to get wind of what is going
on, but this neither alters the on-going processes nor enriches them.
Granted, the presence of anybody who so wishes at full council meetings does introduce an
element of transparency in the process. However, transparency that is not supported by
meaningful participation only leads to agony and helplessness as the governed take note of
what is going on but realise that they cannot change things without recourse to drastic
measures. Which is why agitation results. There is something critically wrong with the
processing of the input. The mechanisms in place do not encourage broad consensus. They
breed controversy, which controversy as noted has no formal forum to address it except
through complaints, threats, litigation and general ‘rebel rousing’. In such a situation central
government’s emotional outbursts and often uninformed intervention is hardly surprising.
In view of the above the efficacy of the structures in place has to be re-evaluated.
Institutionally there is no doubt that the potential for good local governance is there. It is the
mechanisms that seem to be flawed. The lack of guidelines on how to handle input from
diverse stakeholders and how to include the stakeholders at some stage of the deliberations is
a major weakness. Legally only full council is open to the public. Legally, the public only
comes to full council to observe and be entertained by their representatives’ antics. There is
virtually nothing in place to compel the local authority to open up. In this, one cannot
begrudge the governors because they are in any case exercising their legal rights and
obligations as prescribed in the law. But then good governance transcends the state, it allows
citizens and groups to wield power and authority as well as influence and enact policies and
decisions. In this way good governance is a broader notion than government (see IIAS, 1996).
Evidence shows there is no official recognition of this fact in the system of governance in
Harare.
This oversight has significant implications for urban governance. As one commentary notes
“governance comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which
citizens and groups articulate their interests mediate their differences and exercise their legal
rights and obligations” (GDRC, 2000). In the absence of this articulation of interests, there are
bound to be errors of omission and commission. The result is a flawed type of governance
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that barely transcends the state, its views, needs and priorities. This does not usher in urban
sustainability. In such a system there are no competing interests – whether environmental or
social. There is an imposed unitary interest - that of the governors. Such a system is the exact
antithesis of the Inclusive City (UNCHS/UNEP, 2000: 2). The enormity of this oversight
becomes clear when one takes into account the fact that the Sustainable City should be an
Inclusive City.
8.2 The two-type official methodology
Having gone through the decision-making structures and processes in Harare, it is possible at
this stage to draw some conclusions on the local authority’s methodology of achieving its
version of urban sustainability. The city has two related approaches, namely regulation and
criminalisation. Figure 11 presents a simplified diagram of the workings of the two-type
methodology and what appears to be the guiding philosophy behind it.
FIGURE 11: OFFICIAL METHODOLOGY FOR ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIETAL ISSUES
The local authority’s methodology is based on two premises. First is the conviction that some
activities, while not iniquitous in themselves, are or have the potential of being done wrongly,
perhaps through some excesses or oversight. The ideal, according to the local authority, is to
ensure that they are done correctly. In such a situation the remedy is to provide guidance and
direction by means of controls. This is achieved through regulatory instruments, which for
example, prescribe appropriate land uses, quantities, conservation requirements, entitlements
and penalties for violations. Urban agriculture best illustrates this approach. While the practice
is permissible some controls are imposed on such aspects as location, land ownership and
eligibility. The same approach relates to outbuildings, where the local authority requires
adherence to building, planning, public health, safety and environmental sanitation
regulations.
The second premise relates to activities which are taking place, but which according to the
ideal should not be happening at all. The dumping of untreated effluent or raw sewage into
the city’s water sources is an example. The only remedy is to stop such activities. The
instrument in this case is criminalisation – a process where those who practice such nefarious
activities are technically no longer ‘practitioners’ or ‘doers’ but ‘perpetrators’. Having been
caught carrying out such illicit activities the perpetrators are hauled before the courts and
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charged with a crime where restitution will be required or a custodial penalty is imposed. Spot
fines and ‘admission of guilt fines’ are exacted in some instances for those who are not ready
to contest the local authority’s case against them.
The two-type methodology is effectuated through enforcement. The city deploys its resources
to make sure that things are done correctly and that those that are not supposed to be taking
place are effectively stopped. Harare’s own municipal police does the enforcement sometimes
with the help of the state police (the ZRP) and the fearsome riot squad. These state institutions
come in when the city enforces its edicts in what it perceives to be very volatile environments.
Through the years the municipal police has always executed evictions, forced relocations as
well as the destruction of shacks, tuckshops and markets while the state machinery keeps a
close watch.
8.3 Missing – a complementary methodology?
The system is rightly concerned with controlling and rooting out negative developments in the
area under its jurisdiction. Be that as it may, the regulation-criminalisation fixation has
become so strong that it crowds out other more innovative methodologies that could
compliment this two-type methodology. Policy issues are not always situations that need
redress. Policy issues are not always threats; sometimes they present themselves as
opportunities (cf. Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). This is where the system misses out. Figure 12
presents a complementary methodology that the city authorities appear not to be aware of or
concerned about in their handling of environmental and societal issues.
This is yet another oversight that has implications for urban governance. The city authorities
are so convinced that the governed are prone to misbehave that it tries to limit, redress or
eliminate the damage that they inflict or could inflict, hence the regulatory and criminalisation
mentality. This explains why in pursuing its own framework of urban sustainability the local
authority has adopted crude versions of defensive and offensive strategies (cf. Priemus, 1999:
213) aimed at reigning in its errant subjects.
Notably, trust is an attribute of good governance (cf. Wekwete, 1997). In a situation charged
with suspicion and a mutual lack of confidence, it is impossible to interact let alone
reciprocate. Where there is no interaction, it is difficult to be innovative or discover
opportunities. Considering its closed nature, the system’s lack of vision as far as opportunities
are concerned is to be expected. Interestingly the UNDP (1997) lists a shared ‘strategic vision’
as an essential characteristic of good urban governance.
FIGURE 12: THE UNTAPPED METHODOLOGY
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There is no known attempt to discover opportunities that could be exploited for the collective
benefit of the urban system or any of its subsystems. This is true principally in the socio-
economic sector (Kamete, 1997a). Figure 12 shows that in this complementary perspective
the ideal is to capitalise on these opportunities. As shown in the diagram encouragement is a
necessary but not sufficient ‘remedy’ for this methodology. It may be necessary to do away
with regulatory and statutory instruments through the granting of permission and removal of
controls. This is not a new realisation. Deregulation and decriminalisation have been proposed
before as useful and viable management tools in the quest for sustainability in the
Zimbabwean context (cf. Gore et al., 1992). The proposition appears to have fallen on deaf
ears.
8.4 Shaping the concept for the local context
It appears that the local authority single-handedly calls the shots in the management of the
affairs of the city of Harare. The system of deliberation and decision-making is closed and
only opens up to listen when there is agitation from non-participants. There is ample evidence
to suggest that this listening does not alter the system’s beliefs, convictions and prescriptions
on socio-economic and environmental issues. Instead, if the noise is perceived to be
particularly troublesome some placatory measures are taken. The most common response is
to allow some elements of the outside grievances to be arbitrarily included in the instruments
already designed or still being processed. This placation sometimes creates major
contradictions in decision outputs with the result that the whole programme practically
becomes paralysed and virtually unimplementable. The case of backyard shacks is a typical
example. While the legal, environmental and financial evils in the shacks are well articulated
and defended, the eventual addition of crudely conceptualised socio-economic and structural
issues made the issue so unwieldy that the governors thought it wise to take no action.
On the basis of the above analysis it can be argued that the city authorities regard themselves
as being solely responsible for shaping and operationalising the concept of urban
sustainability in Harare. Council filters and defines issues based on its own perceptions and
the advice of technocrats in the technical departments. Any contributions outside the
governors’ circle are at best informal and non-obligatory. Some consultants are sometimes
called in to produce some plans or reports on issues the city feels hazy about (Figure 10).
Nevertheless this transaction is strictly business. The ‘city’ can accept or reject the proposals.
Even after accepting the proposals the local authority is under no obligation to implement
them. Whatever environmental or societal interpretations the city authorities have and likes
are turned into official programmes. In the end the whole city is supposed to unite and rally
behind the resultant instruments.
To be fair, the diversity of representatives in council does promote debate and a measure of
accountability. Representatives are supposed to report back to the electorate. However in all
cases they report what everybody else already knows because it has been discussed in a full
council meeting, has been leaked or is in the print and electronic media. This shortcoming is
not of the representatives’ own making. What is discussed in council committees officially
remains a secret until the Executive Committee deliberates on it and agrees that it should be
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on the agenda of the full council meeting23 (Figure 9). Obviously, this drastically reduces what
little transparency and accountability there is in the process.
On the ‘outside’, environmental pressure groups monopolise the shaping of the concept of
sustainability to suit the local context. The nature of their composition (rich retirees or
volunteers supported by industry, commerce and international organisations) means that if
they so desire they can mobilise their vast human, material and financial resources to agitate
against a decision or drive home a point. And they do almost always become heard. Their
contributions to the sustainability debate – which invariably consist of threats, alarms,
bargaining, negotiation and brinkmanship (Table 1 and Figure 4) – are the ones that are
received and sometimes processed by the governance system. The resultant perception by the
city officials, both professional and elected is thus to some extent moulded by these
environmental pressure groups. These perceptions are the ones that may be included in the
translation and eventually drive the search for urban sustainability.
The moulding of the ‘local version’ of urban sustainability by influential environmental
pressure groups is narrowed down to the natural environment. They are champions of
preservation, which according to Merrett means "the protection of nature against man" (1995:
11). To them, the protection of nature is the ultimate and only aim of sustainability. They do
not look any further than that. Asked about her understanding of sustainability, the head of
one of the foremost groups gave the famous Brundtland Report's definition of sustainable
development, namely, "...development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs" (WCED, 1987: 43). Her
answers to subsequent follow-up questions indicated that her interpretation of the definition
was confined to ecological preservation (Kamete, 1997). It is this interpretation which is, as it
were, imposed onto the urban governance system by these civic groups. As noted sometimes
they do find willing listeners in the governors.
First to suffer because of this narrow perception is the socio-economic sphere. The poor find
themselves at the wrong end of the resultant by-laws, directives, plans and policies. Thus
because of the absence of broad based governance, consensus and mediation the "protection
of nature against humankind" sums up what Zimbabwe's capital has adopted as its method of
achieving sustainability. The fact that Harare is one of the few clean (and liveable?) capitals in
sub-Saharan Africa might have prompted the city governors to be overly protective.
Somehow they consider the poor, rather than poverty, to be the greatest threat to
environmental sustainability.
There is some truth in this viewpoint. After all, experience has demonstrated that it is the poor
who colonise undevelopable and fragile land along the banks of the Mukuvisi River that feeds
into Harare's main water supply. It is also the poor who engage in illegal and environmentally
destructive stream-bank cultivation and other forms of urban agriculture which pollute the
city's landscape and water courses (see Mbiba, 1995). These same poor people are seen on
street corners, open spaces, shop fronts and pavements where, as vendors, they
‘inconvenience law abiding citizens’ while at the same time generating tonnes of solid waste
every week. This they do, in spite of the fact that there are officially designated vending sites
in the city. In the residential areas, it is not uncommon to find several times more people per
                                                  
23 Occasionally the code of secrecy is broken as dissatisfied or publicity-loving councillors leak out some vital
information.
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stand than is legally permissible (see above). Worse still, the extra population is housed in
thousands of illegal shacks, most of them violating every operative regulation on public
health, safety and environmental sanitation. Also, tuckshops are littered across the high-
density areas, most of them without requisite services and planning permission.24
These misdemeanours have made it easy for the governors to readily accept the prescriptions
of alarmed environmental pressure groups. Eradication is not a bad term for the methodology
adopted. By persuasion and by force, they have been trying to put an end to these maladies in
order to preserve nature. This selective targeting of the poor in pursuit of environmental
preservation has had complex and interesting results, some of them unintended.
The confirmed obsession with the natural environment suggests that strong sustainability
(Box 6), where absolutely no environmental ‘disruption’ is allowed is the officially chosen
version. Nature is perceived as the victim, and humankind, precisely the poor, as the villain.
Battle lines have been drawn between the two. The blind and indiscriminate way in which this
notion has been translated on the ground has had two significant effects.
Firstly this deformed translation has seriously compromises the ability of the present
generation of the poor to meet its current needs, while not guaranteeing the ability of their
posterity to meet theirs (cf. WCED, 1987; UNDP, 1997). Effectively there has been an
officially orchestrated impairment of the survival of the poor without seeking to understand
their side of the issue. Neither has their been broad-based attempts to find alternatives,
diagnose underlying causes and therefore come up with workable and acceptable solutions.
As noted above the instruments adopted by the urban governors carry only one message, that
the poor have to stop harming the environment at all costs.
Secondly, the official translation has led to the adoption of environmental management and
protection instruments that are difficult to enforce. This is fully discussed in Box 8. Whether
the instruments churned out are not enforced or enforceable because of reluctance,
complexity or resistance, it is clear that a significant proportion of the difficulties arises from
the internal characteristics of the system of urban governance, how it processes inputs and
how it comes up with a package of actionable instruments.
A poor understanding of the role of nature to human activities, coupled with the narrowly
defined concept and incorrectly formulated problem, have meant that the outputs of the
system are inevitably erroneous, blind and disruptive, at least as far as the urban poor are
concerned. As noted earlier in this discussions, economic structural adjustment and an under-
performing economy have resulted in thousands of breadwinners being made jobless, this in
the face of rising costs of living in the absence of a working national social security system.
Even the gainfully employed have had to contend with eroded wages. They have all turned to
nature for survival. This nature, as we have seen, is the site of human (survival) activities, the
source of raw materials, and the sink of human wastes (Merrett, 1995:7; Woodhouse, 1992:
103). Negative environmental preservation policies, regulations, resolutions, laws and
directives have hit directly at the logistics of survival for the majority of the urban poor.
Looking at the existing instruments, one can only conclude that they are meant to ‘subject’
human survival to the preservation of nature.
                                                  
24 At a news conference in July 1999 the town clerk of Harare claimed that there were over 80 000 illegal
structures in the high-density areas of Harare. It should be noted that these are the areas that house most of the
cities poor.
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8.5 The reaction
Empirical evidence suggests that the poor have had their reaction shaped by these
instruments. All of them view a ‘sustainable urban environment’, not as a necessity to their
survival but as an impediment. Discussions with the poor in various parts of the city reveal
that the poor wonder what on earth can be gained from open spaces, beautiful flowers, clean
water, preserved bushes and clean streets when people are jobless, hungry, homeless, dirty
and naked. To them, preserved nature is a hobby for the rich who do not have to worry about
the logistics of day to day survival (compare Thomson, 1990).
BOX 8. PARALYSIS OF ENFORCEMENT?
There are three primary causes of the lack of enforcement of some key instruments
coming from the local authority. These are reluctance, complexity and resistance.
Reluctance
In Harare there are regulatory instruments that do not allow unauthorised cultivation on
publicly owned land and/or open spaces. This is done to prevent among other things the
abuse of fragile land and stream-bank cultivation. Every rainy season numerous
warnings reading "NO CULTIVATION" and translated into the vernacular are placed at
all open spaces known to be used for agriculture. Residents ignore them. For over four
years now, they have been able to cultivate and harvest their maize and sweet potato
crops without any problem. The local authority cannot claim to have lacked the
resources to enforce such regulations. What they lacked was something else, perhaps
political blessings, ‘the will or the guts’ (analyst).
Complexity
The eradication of backyard shacks is a unique case. These unauthorised structures
have been condemned ad infinitum on environmental, public health and safety grounds.
Since 1997 the local authority has tried twice to destroy the shacks. In the first instance
it gave notice but could not proceed after the announcement raised a public furore. In
2001 the local authority proceeded to destroy over 500 shacks without giving notice.
Then the minister came in and ordered them to stop telling the commissioners that ‘they
could go’. The destruction was stopped forthwith. Council did not revise its policy. It just
became inactive, refusing to regularise them but at the same time afraid to continue
enforcing its by-laws.
Resistance
In a bid to eliminate environmentally undesirable illegal structures and force adherence
to its by-laws, council resolved to eradicate illegal tuckshops in the high-density areas.
After a two-day destruction campaign, a sustained wave of public demonstrations
resulted in the minister flanked with some black empowerment activists ordering a stop
to the action. The issue raised political questions and invited so much resistance that
the local authority had to regularise the tuckshops. The process began immediately,
with the minister appointing his own committee to supervise progress.
This is why when the poor feel they have been unfairly treated by urban management
instruments, which in their opinion are attacking their very livelihood they disrupt the
processes by literally going on a rampage. It is during this time that they find a force to
counterbalance environmental pressure groups. In the same way that environmental groups
‘raise a dust’ when any action by the poor or decision by council threatens environmental
sustainability, national institutions of governance have been known to come up and defend
the livelihood of the poor in the face of perceived threats. MPs are more than a match for the
environmentalists in forcing an audience with council. They complain, mobilise and become
such a nuisance that council eventually listens. The minister, another pro-poor ally is more
than a match for the environmentalists. He gets what he wants not by persuasion and
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negotiation but by exercising his legal authority. From 1997 to 2001 the two ministers of local
government have intervened in five landmark cases25 in favour of the poor. All the five
interventions have shown no regard for environmental consequences.
The reaction of the poor and the subsequent processes that are set in motion show that where
questions of survival are concerned, any laws that go contrary to the survival strategies of the
poor are not taken seriously. They raise moral and political questions, which is why their
enforcement becomes a problem. Harare is precisely in this situation. There is a complex
array of institutions, legal and policy instruments in place. These instruments are not being
translated into action, because they simply cannot be implemented without raising the
fundamental issues mentioned above (Box 8).
9 WHAT IS WRONG?
There are some serious deficiencies in the urban governance system. These have to do mainly
with (1) the selective and biased reception of inputs being fed into the system, (2) inadequate
and inefficient processing, and (3) half-baked outputs that eventually issue out of the system.
Significant among these ‘wrongs’ are the following aspects:
¨ Elitist domination of the sustainability debate
¨ The dichotomisation and antagonisation of society and nature
¨ ‘Hooking-on’ and ‘fashion driven’ urban management styles
¨ Following the easy way out
The rest of this paper will explain and substantiate the foregoing assertion.
9.1 Elitist domination of the sustainability debate
The moulding of and search for sustainability in Harare is a prerogative of the local authority.
Sometimes a few privileged stakeholder groups find their way in. Dominating these lucky
ones are environmentalists. Once they find themselves in they inevitably force an
environmental tag onto the debate and processes. Needless to say there is ‘social exclusion’ in
the environmental debate (cf. Vanderschueren et al., 1997: 40). This lack of broad-based
participation means that the ideas put into the system and then processed and eventually
churned out are those of a minority, be it the local authority or some sections of civil society.
There is virtually no consensus building and no mediation. It is not surprising then that the
goals sought, the objectives adopted and the eventual strategies designed are suspect on
technical, political and moral grounds. Ironically this social exclusion ends up working against
the very environment it is meant to protect against the misdeeds of the poor. As noted above,
one way or the other the concerns of the poor get attention through the disruptive intervention
of central government. Once this happens the environmental causes are effectively sidelined.
Interestingly the Environmental Planning and Management (EPM) Source Book, which seeks
to facilitate the implementation of the Urban Environment Agenda adopted at Habitat II,
emphasises the importance of consensus building. It points out that in preparing and
implementing environmental strategies in urban areas “…experience has shown the
importance of effective processes for consensus building” (UNCHS/UNEP, 1997: 31). The
same Source Book states that "strategy building is not simply a technical exercise" but spans
across a range of "technical, political, social and economic factors and interests." In view of
                                                  
25 These are backyard shacks, urban agriculture, tuckshops, food markets and squatting.
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this it should come as no surprise that the narrowly defined and elitist dominated pursuit of
environmental sustainability in Harare is facing numerous hitches in its operationalisation.
9.2 The dichotomization and antagonisation of society and nature
It is this narrow-minded ‘environmentalisation’ of sustainability that has led to the separation
and eventual estrangement of society and the nature. The perceptions of a few who in the
view of the majority do not have to worry about immediate needs of sustenance continue to
define environmental strategies and objectives, which as generally perceived, translated and
implemented directly impair the survival strategies of the majority. Those who are negatively
affected end up being practically nauseated by any issue that has environmental overtones,
which as brought out in the preceding discussion, they consider to be a hobby of the rich
and/or the powerful. Ultimately they end up identifying conservation with economic status,
wealth and power.
Because of their perceived obsession with the protection of the natural environment the
designers and enforcers of environmental protection instruments are inevitably identified with
oppression. In the minds of those adversely affected by the outputs of the system
conservation becomes closely intertwined with repression. This in turn builds up resentment
and evokes various forms of resistance that include destruction and defiance The resistance
thus built makes very difficult the enforcement of whatever policing measures adopted.
9.3 Hooking-on and fashion driven management styles
Like most of their African counterparts, Harare’s urban managers are conscious of the latest
styles in the urban management arena. They are keen to adopt every new concept that
happens to be popular. This they do by hooking onto the latest management and
administrative fashions. The problem is that there are many concepts floating around at any
one time (Box 9). Consequently, as noted by one commentator, like ‘a glutton faced with too
much food, the system swallows the concepts, without properly chewing them’. This has led
to problems of ‘administrative indigestion’.
BOX 9: THE MANY CONCEPTS AND THE SYSTEM HAS
HOOKED ONTO
Sustainable development
Environmental sustainability
Gender and development
Poverty reduction
Local economic development
Increasing foreign direct investment
Commercialisation
Privatisation
Decentralisation
Public-private partnerships
Private sector participation
Creating an enabling environment
Public participation
Good governance
There is nothing wrong with striving to be up-to-date. It is the way that the system approaches
the urban management ‘fashion scene’. As one key informant noted, “Fashion-conscious
people have the good sense of mixing and matching these accessories, making them all
47
contribute towards one goal, a well-dressed individual.” The urban governance system has yet
to learn this artistry. Like the clothing fashion, the concepts cited above come in separate
packages, at different times, usually from different ‘fashion houses’ (such as academic and
research institutions, NGOs, pressure groups, and aid agencies) each one focusing on at least
one of the dimensions of sustainability, namely society, economy and ecology. Whatever
their origin, focus or emphasis they all contribute towards one goal, viz., urban sustainability.
In Harare’s case the processing of the concepts received is inefficient at the level of the
governors at both local and central government levels. These issues are received separately
and compartmentalised. Sometimes they are not institutionalised at all, although the city will
be paying a lot of lip service to them. There is virtually no evidence of the system realising
that these concepts are but different facets of urban sustainability (Box 9).
9.4 Following the easy way out
Adopting and implementing environmental policies appears to be one of the easiest options in
the search for sustainable urban development. After all in pursuit of environmental
preservation, the local authority only has to pass regulations, usually penal, to force the
adoption or banning of certain practices. This is done at virtually no cost to the governance
system except maybe a redeployment of manpower to do the enforcement. The fact that
virtually no active enforcement takes place in most cases (Box 8) makes the environment a
relatively convenient dimension to tackle.
This illusion is very attractive when compared to the taxing, arduous and mind-boggling
issues like enhancing people's livelihoods, promoting local economic development and
addressing poverty. These non-environmental aspects are also involving, time-consuming and
controversial. Urban managers are not too keen to be embroiled in such issues, unless they
have to. Faced with these realities, the urban governors understandably elevate the
environmental dimension as the panacea for sustainable urban development. Environmental
preservation is naturally reduced to the easy and convenient method of indiscriminate control
epitomised by regulation and criminalisation.
10 PRO-POOR AND PRO-ENVIRONMENT CIVIL SOCIETY: AN APPRAISAL
10.1 Politicisation
Perhaps due to the fact that pro-poor groups cannot match the intellectual and material
resources of pro-environment groups, the local version of urban sustainability, which as noted
above rarely goes beyond environmental management, has been politicised. That the poor
regularly find refuge in the politics of the day is to be expected. The observation by Pino
(1998: 257) of “patronage politics and popular mobilisation” being “weapons of the weak” is
applicable in the Harare context. The poor are aware of their political value and are keen to
use this asset to extract some “goods or services” from those who would want to receive
reciprocal benefits from them.
Needless to say, politicisation changes the texture of the processes in the system of
governance. If current development go on unchecked, the situation in Harare is sure to reach a
stage where labels will be turned inside out. Already, there are situations where this is
happening. For example, where governors and environmental groups talk of ‘law-breakers’,
‘criminals’, and ‘perpetrators’, higher order politics comes in to label them ‘victims’
whereupon the politicians – in particular the minister responsible for local government –
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become the ‘protectors’. The villains in this reconstituted ‘struggle’ become the urban
governors and the pro-environment groups. Recent developments relating to tuckshops and
backyard shacks can be viewed in this new light. As shown above politicisation introduces
new dimensions to the debates with some purely political and race-based groups like the
AAG and ZITOA stepping in to reinforce the minister’s bid to ‘protect’ the destitute,
powerless and the voiceless.
That environmental issues in Harare have been politicised is a fact. It is a fact also that this is
in part a result of the wholesale environmentalisation of the quest for urban sustainability.
However, to single out the dominance and success of environmental groups as the sole cause
of this politicisation would be an exaggeration. Pro-environment groups have managed to
sneak into the system because they have a strategy and are quick to pick issues and act on
them. Pro-poor groups on the other hand lack a coherent proactive programme. They wait for
council to take action and then start crying foul. In this way when pro-poor civil society
politicise issues it is partly a reflection of their failure to keep up with the pace of
developments on the flawed governance front. If blame is to be apportioned, a large part of it
should be allocated to the pro-poor groups themselves and the system of governance, in
particular the processes taking place therein.
10.2 The shortcomings of pro-poor groups
There is an abundance and variety of pro-poor groups in Harare. Among the 16 groups
identified are discussion groups such as the Poverty Reduction Forum and practitioner groups
like ZITOA, HAVAZ and ZISA. In addition there are groups that are concerned with the
welfare of particular segments of society such as women, the homeless, street children and
the disabled. In numerical terms pro-poor groups outnumber their pro-environment
counterparts by a ratio of more than 4:1 (Table 15); and this refers to organised and known
groups only. In spite of this, the latter heavily ‘outgun’ the former; hence the apparent ease
with which they sometimes manage to break into the tightly closed local governance system,
while pro-poor groups remain excluded.
Pro-environment groups are true advocates in the sense that they speak for the environment
and seem to know what they are talking about. They have successfully tagged their
environmental advocacy to issues of urban sustainability, thus getting the attention of not
only the local enlightened but also of international donors like Danida (Danida, 2000). In 2000
alone the Danish aid agency poured Z$28 million into a two-year air pollution campaign
spearheaded by Environmental 2000 (E2000, 2000).
Table 15: An overview of pro-poor and pro-environment groups in Harare
26
Pro-environment Pro-poor
Local International Discussion
groups
Special and interest
Groups27
Practitioners Homeless International
E2000 Danida PRF Disabled ZITOA DSHZ UNDP
CHRA Street children (2) ZISA ZIHOPFE SAPRI
HICP Women (3) HAVAZ CFH
AAG HPZ
ZCTU
                                                  
26 This table relates specifically to Harare during the period of the study and on the issues in question.
27 Number in brackets indicates the total number of groups
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In contrast, pro-poor groups do not have this kind of support mostly because they do not
appeal to the ‘big picture’. They talk about survival as if it is not linked to anything else in the
urban system. When they speak out it is to complain or ask for funds or, in the case of
discussion forums, to ‘analyse’ issues and issue out communiqués and recommendations,
which in most cases never go beyond the conference proceedings volume. The rare
exceptions to this are the Poverty Reduction Forum and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade
Unions (ZCTU). On at least one occasion the PRF working with civil society among them the
influential ZCTU gave recommendations to central government on addressing the vicissitudes
of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (SAPRI, 1999). The UNDP
makes the exaggerated claim that the increase in the health budget for the year 2000 was an
immediate result of the PRF’s budget recommendations presented to a pre-budget seminar
for parliamentarians (UNDP, 2000).
There are serious weaknesses in the pro-poor approach. They ‘aim big’, concerning
themselves with wider issues like proving how disruptive structural adjustment is and trying
to figure out what the ideal national budget should be. Consequently they end up ignoring or
even bypassing local governance and opting instead to reach out to national governance. This
perhaps explains why pro-poor groups always find their defenders from institutions of
national governance. Interestingly their main patron, the UNDP emphasises the importance of
governance, which it labels as the “missing link” in the quest to reduce poverty (UNDP, 2000:
54). The UNDP report however, leaves no doubt as to what level of governance it considers
important. The downplaying of local governance by the PRF, which is a creation of the
UNDP, is therefore not surprising.
An analysis of the activities of pro-poor and pro-environment civil society in Harare shows
that environmental groups have been able make two crucial achievements which pro-poor
groups have failed to do. In the first instance environmental groups have been able to link
their stance to sustainability, thereby adding power and relevance to their demand. The
second achievement is that they have recognised local governance as an entry point. This is
significant because it is at the local level that fundamental action programmes shaping the
running of the city are set out.
10.3 Responding to instruments without challenging the basis
The greatest challenge to the social dimension as shown in this paper is the
environmentalisation of urban sustainability. Strangely, pro-poor groups have failed to mount
a successful challenge to this perception. Nor have they tried to reorient the city governors or
at the least to broaden their view. It seems that the groups remain content as long as they can
mount short-term, issue specific challenges to resultant action instruments issuing out of the
system of local governance. As demonstrated above with a little noise and politically
motivated help this ‘guerrilla warfare’ does lead to changes in the contentious instrument.
However, this does nothing to change the fundamental premise upon which council decisions
are based. For example in March 2001 Dialogue on Shelter for the Homeless (DSHZ) and the
Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation (ZIHOPFE) mounted a spirited international
campaign to stop the destruction of backyard shacks by the city authorities (ACHR, 2001;
ZIHOPFE, 2001). The campaign was a success in getting a reprieve, but the local authority’s
resolve to eradicate the structures in question has not changed. The acting chairperson of the
commission is on record (Justgiving, 2001) as stressing:
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Harare is being reduced to a town of cabins and backyard shacks and the
commission is not going to allow that. Our resolution to demolish illegal
structures still stands and we are not going to stop at anything. Residents should
know that there are by-laws they have to abide by and that the commission has no
sympathy for whoever violates the by-laws.
Thus, like the legendary sword of Damocles the threat of demolition still hangs above the
heads of the 500,000 people housed in illegal structures, mainly because council has not
changed its view of the structures; and the pro-poor groups have done nothing to engage
council with a view to changing the governors’ perception. Despite this, groups like the
DSHZ, ZIHOPFE, CFH and HPZ continue to concentrate on helping their constituency
acquire houses without being ‘side-tracked’ by the fundamental issues of local governance
which have the real potential to adversely affect the people they serve.
There are no partnerships between pro-poor and pro-environment civil society. There are no
direct conflicts either. It appears that as organisations the two hardly notice each other. In
place of engaging each other, the groups look for support and sponsorship from other
quarters. Pro-poor groups, as noted in the preceding discussion, appeal to higher offices of
national governance. They also find sporadic interest and sympathy from international
agencies as well as the academic and research community (SAPRI, 1999). Pro-environment
groups solicit for material, moral and intellectual support from the private sector, some
bilateral and multilateral agencies and affluent residents. They also make good use of the
academic and research community (E2000, 2000; Danida, 2000).
11 CONCLUSION
The preceding discourse suggests that a centralised and undemocratic conceptualisation of
sustainability does have undesirable results that are not conducive for the attainment of
sustainability in the short or long-term. The system of urban governance is central to the
moulding and operationalisation of the quest for sustainability. What goes into the system,
how it is processed and what comes out of it are all crucial in this search. In the case of
Harare, something is not functioning well in the search for sustainability. While the structures
seem to be sound, the processes appear to be flawed. This is particularly so with respect to
decision making. Once inputs are received, the system as represented by the local authority
becomes a black box.
Apart from the local authority’s monopolistic grip on decision-making, the search for urban
sustainability is shaped by accidental ‘participation’ from environmental pressure groups
whose understanding of the concept is also suspect and equally myopic. The results of these
inadequacies are among others serious weaknesses at the processing stage and the resultant
production of action-instruments that do not take into account the economic and social
aspects of urban sustainability. The important components of sustainability (economic, social,
environmental) are captured separately, never consolidated in policies and strategies, and are
seldom co-ordinated at the implementation phase.
These weaknesses have compromised the system in several important ways, the most critical
of which is the stepping in of national political institutions to ‘restore’ justice and fairness by
championing the cause of the marginalised and excluded poor. When this happens it is the
ecological component that suffers as the ‘justice’ as interpreted by the ‘protectors’ of the poor
means suspending, sidelining or disregarding what are perceived to be impediments in the
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survival efforts of the disempowered poor. In most cases this means going against
environmental preservation instruments.
In view of the foregoing it can be concluded that the strategy for achieving sustainability in
Harare hinges very much on the governance system appreciating, streamlining and reconciling
issues of growth, survival and conservation. It also depends on shaping environmental
policies, statutes and strategies to take cognisance of the fact that there need not be a conflict
between nature and society and that conservation is far more workable than preservation. The
environmentalisation of sustainability cannot bring in the Sustainable City; neither can
politicisation.
The very first step that should be taken is a thorough conceptual clean-up. This involves a well
thought out incorporation of the social and economic dimensions into the quest for
sustainable urban development. The managers and policy makers need a lot of help to shed
off some of the myopia that has gripped the system and lulled it into believing that
environmental preservation through regulation and criminalisation is the only route to urban
sustainability.
The conceptual clean-up should be done simultaneously with the democratisation of the
process to go beyond the local authority and some sections of civil society. Other
stakeholders from the social sciences (for example economists, planners and social workers)
as well as interest groups in human rights, residents’ associations, informal sector groups,
women's organisations and political parties can contribute a lot in enriching the debate. These
broader inputs will also benefit from more efficient processing. The outputs therefrom will be
much better in terms of quality and effectiveness than the present ones.
The democratisation of the sustainability debate will also help resolve the emerging conflict
between society and nature. As outlined earlier on, the system is badly in need of consensus
building. There is definitely no need to separate human and economic development from
environmental wellbeing. Once the debate is democratised it will be easy to get rid of the
administrative indigestion caused by hooking onto fashionable management and development
concepts from all sides of the globe. Different experts and interest groups will be able to
position these styles within their range of interests and competence and feed these into the
system in a more well thought out and systematic manner.
Thus instead of the indigestion and the indecisiveness that it brings, one will see the
conversion of the system into a decisive and incisive receptor and processor of the various
stimuli that it gets from all stakeholders. This may help get rid of the tendency to grab onto
many similar things and then separating or even pitting them against each other in terms of
institutionalisation and resource deployment. The integration of social wellbeing, economic
development and environmental protection can definitely benefit from the enriched outputs
resulting from better inputs, reception and processing.
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13 APPENDICES
Appendix 1: From council to commission…but still the same
In February 1999, the then Minister of Local Government and National Housing (LGNH) suspended the Executive Mayor and
the entire council for alleged incompetence. Mubvami and Wekwete (2000: 12) point out that some “…evidence from Harare
has shown that the suspended Executive Mayor and his council took many decisions which greatly jeopardised the long-term
viability of the local authority.” That the suspension was widely welcome is a reflection that there was no love lost between the
mayor, the government and the ratepayers (Kahiya, 1999).
The minister who invoked his powers as stipulated in the Urban Councils Act justified his move on the grounds that he was
trying to put a stop to the plummeting conditions in the city, a problem that he attributed to bad governance. Among the long
list detailing the incompetence of the sacked mayor and councillors were the inability to provide water to some residential
areas, in particular the high-density suburb of Mabvuku, failure to pay workers and a marked deterioration in refuse
collection. It later emerged that council, in addition to being impervious to ‘outside’ voices, was increasingly becoming an
elitist institution with the Executive Committee, chaired by the mayor assuming dictatorial tendencies and shutting out
councillors who were not in that influential committee (see Figure 8).
It was then that the minister appointed a nine-member commission to run the affairs of the city and bring the city back to
normalcy, thus paving way for an elected council. The commission, two of whose members were chosen from a list provided
by the residents’ association took over the tasks of the sacked council and reconstituted the council committees as the
decision making structures. This therefore meant that the policy making arm of the local authority retained its structure,
processes, mandates and characteristics. What it lost were the personalities. In essence, then the system of governance
remained fundamentally the same.
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